understanding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

a publication of the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

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Based on the 2005 MAPW publication “Australia and the NPT 2005, Getting serious about ridding the world of WMDs” Principal authors: Dr Sue Wareham, Dimity Hawkins and Loretta O’Brien. With assistance from Dr Marianne Hanson and members of the MAPW National Council


About the Medical Association for Prevention of War

The Medical Association for Prevention of War (MAPW) Australia is an organisation of health professionals dedicated to the prevention of armed conflict and the abolition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It is affiliated with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.

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About ICAN

ICAN is the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, initiated by MAPW and IPPNW. ICAN focuses on the roots of the nuclear weapons problem - the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a small minority of countries, who risk their use by design, accident, miscalculation or by terrorists, and whose weapons are an incentive to others to also become nuclear armed. ICAN aims to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention to ban the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons. ICAN in Australia greatly benefits from the support of the Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund).

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Understanding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Mayor Iccho Itoh, Mayor of the Japanese city of Nagasaki and Vice-President of Mayors for Peace, who was assassinated in April 2007

“The time has come for those nations that rely on the force of nuclear armaments to respectfully heed the voices of peace-loving people, not the least the atomic bomb survivors, to strive in good faith for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to advance towards the complete abolition of all such weapons.”

Mayor Iccho Itoh, Nagasaki Peace Declaration, 9 August 2006

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Summary and recommendations

THE NPT MUST NOT BE AN EMPTY PROMISE

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever created. No other weapon has the same potential to produce human and environmental catastrophe on such an unprecedented scale and with effects so far into the future. Even biological and chemical weapons, while they are among the most inhumane and morally repugnant of humankind’s creations, do not match the potential for devastation of nuclear weapons.

“Nuclear weapons have vastly different destructive properties. A single one can physically destroy an entire city instantaneously, kill hundreds of thousands of people, and leave lingering delayed radioactivity that will deny access to a very large area for many years. A nuclear weapon is truly a weapon of mass destruction – of both people and of the facilities and services that would be needed to care for a very large number of wounded and irradiated victims.”

From the time of the first use of nuclear weapons in war in 1945 on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was recognised both among senior military leaders and in civil society that the new form of destruction that had been unleashed was a grave threat to civilisation. President Truman’s Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy expressed his grave concerns:

“The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender...My own feeling is that in being the use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”

Calls for the total abolition of nuclear weapons were swift. The first resolution of the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations in January 1946 demanded the “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

Since then countless appeals and resolutions at the UN and elsewhere have repeated the call. Opinion polls in many countries have confirmed that the majority of the world’s people want to live in a nuclear weapons free world. Their aspiration has been repeatedly thwarted by a handful of nations that maintain between them approximately 27,000 nuclear weapons. These nations assume for themselves the right to threaten mass destruction and impose the obligation to live with that threat on other nations.

Recognition of the enormous dangers posed by nuclear weapons is evident by the nearly universal membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Treaty is not only an essential barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, but it is also the only legally binding and explicit commitment to nuclear disarmament by the major nuclear powers. These two goals cannot be separated. If nuclear disarmament does not occur, non-proliferation will fail, and we will live in an increasingly nuclear-armed world.

The next NPT Review Conference will be held at the United Nations in New York in 2010. In the lead up to this there are three Preparatory Committee meetings, one held in Vienna in 2007, the next to be held in early 2008 (in Geneva) and then 2009 (location yet to be confirmed). However the Treaty’s very survival is threatened by increasing frustration on the part of many nations that its promise of nuclear disarmament is not only not being fulfilled, but that the nuclear weapon States are walking away from their obligations under the Treaty.

Rather than giving a reduced role for nuclear weapons, which has long been understood as a vital step towards disarmament, Australia’s reliance on the US nuclear weapons endorses nuclear terror by sending a message that nuclear weapons have security utility and symbolic power. Australia’s diplomatic efforts towards nuclear disarmament have a dramatically reduced credibility or hope of success while this remains our policy.

The Medical Association for Prevention of War (MAPW) has consistently highlighted the need to strengthen the NPT, while also advocating new approaches to the issue of nuclear disarmament. These approaches must include recognition of the very close links between civilian and military nuclear facilities and the extraordinary difficulties this poses for the challenge of nuclear disarmament. Specifically, we continue to urge action on the part of our government to:

- support the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention;
- maintain the integrity of the NPT, by supporting UN resolutions that promote the dual purposes of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;
- promote the implementation of the 13-step action plan developed at the 2000 Review Conference;
- strengthen non-government participation in Australia’s role at the NPT Review Conference and all Preparatory Committee meetings;
- support the Mayors for Peace goal of nuclear weapons abolition by 2020;
- end Australia’s participation in the nuclear fuel chain.

A particular issue of grave concern is the reported plans to sell Australian uranium to India, one of only four nations globally that are not party to the NPT. Such a move would greatly undermine the NPT, and must be absolutely and strongly opposed.

The abolition of all 27,000 nuclear weapons remains an urgent global imperative. It is a goal that our nation must promote consistently, unequivocally and energetically.
According to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), which reported in June 2006, there are 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with around 12,000 still actively deployed.\(^3\) The force of these weapons is enormous; again, according to the WMD Commission, “the nuclear weapons in one strategic submarine have a combined explosive force several times greater than all the conventional bombs dropped in World War II.”\(^4\)

96% of today’s nuclear weapons belong to two nations, the USA and Russia.

Additional urgency is generated by the fact that the United States and Russia each maintain approximately 2,500 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, or “launch-on-warning” status, for immediate launch in the case of a (real or perceived) nuclear attack. The other major nuclear powers either have de-alerted their forces (China) or maintain far lower levels of alert (Britain and France).

**Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Stockpile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>75-200</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1-10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: All numbers are estimates from the Natural Resources Defense Council, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org*

“The total of both deployed and non-deployed weapons is estimated to be in the vicinity of 27,000. The lack of precision in the number of these weapons (and fissile material stocks) reflects the fragmentary nature of the published information about existing nuclear arsenals. This limited transparency has many implications, including the difficulties it creates for measuring progress in achieving disarmament goals and ensuring accountability.”

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006
Why we need to get rid of them

There are many reasons to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Here are some of the main ones:

**Nuclear weapons are unique in their capacity to cause human suffering...**

The atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima killed approximately 90,000 people immediately and 145,000 by the end of 1945. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki killed approximately 40,000 people immediately and 75,000 by the end of 1945. These two bombs and their destructive capacity are very small by today's standards.

Deaths and injuries resulted from the intense flash of light and heat, hurricane force winds, firestorms and irradiation. Injuries included burns, melting or vaporisation of body parts, multiple fractures, blindness, and radiation sickness. The survivors have elevated rates of cancers and other diseases. The rates of cancer among the survivors are still rising. Nuclear weapons create a radioactive wasteland in which no significant medical help is possible.

**Other nations will want them...**

"So long as any state has such a weapon – especially nuclear arms – others will want them."  
*Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006*

Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has repeatedly warned that non-proliferation is a lost cause unless the major nuclear powers get rid of their weapons. He wrote in *The Economist* (October 16, 2003):

"The very existence of nuclear weapons gives rise to the pursuit of them. They are seen as a source of global influence, and are valued for their perceived deterrent effect. And as long as some countries possess them (or are protected by them in alliances) and others do not, this asymmetry breeds chronic global insecurity."

Similarly, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in 1996 reported that the possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of states is "highly discriminatory and thus unstable" and "a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them."  

At a time when the international community is striving to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, we should surely eliminate those factors that spur proliferation.

**Nuclear weapons will be used again if they are not eliminated...**

"So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic."  
*Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006*

Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since 1945. But the world has come frighteningly close on many occasions, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time, reports that there were huge miscalculations on both sides  and that the world came "a hair's-breadth from nuclear catastrophe."  

Miscalculation and human error can never be eliminated. Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and other accidents stand as grim reminders of this.

The accidental launch of a nuclear missile remains a terrifying possibility, and is in fact even more likely now, with the severe deterioration of command and control structures in Russia, than during the Cold War. Russia and the US retain thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert, whereby a decision to launch could be made within minutes of an incoming missile threat being perceived. In 1995, President Yeltsin was brought his nuclear command suitcase when Russia’s faulty radar systems mistakenly identified a Norwegian weather rocket as a US missile.

**Nuclear deterrence is, and always has been, a myth.**

Nuclear deterrence theory dictates that nuclear weapons will help keep the peace because no nation would risk retaliation from a nuclear-armed adversary. All evidence contradicts the theory. Nuclear weapons did not prevent the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or the Falklands, or Iraqi missile attacks on Israel in 1991, and the suspicion of their existence did not prevent the invasion of Iraq. Nor have they prevented terrorist attacks in nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states such as the US, UK, Spain, Russia and India.

General George Lee Butler, Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Command from 1992 to 1994, who had responsibility for all US Air Force and Navy nuclear weapons, warned powerfully of the risks of nuclear deterrence:

"Nuclear weapons did not and will not, of themselves, prevent major wars, and their presence unnecessarily prolonged and intensified the Cold War. In today’s environment, the threat of use has been exposed as neither credible nor of any military utility."  

In delivering its 1996 advisory opinion on the general illegality of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice treated the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons as a single indivisible concept. An illegal act must be neither committed nor threatened. Mexico’s Ambassador Sergio Gonzalez Galvez in addressing the Court stated,

"Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass rape acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is retaliatory deterence – You burn my city, I will burn yours."

Nuclear deterrence threatens unimaginable suffering and destruction. To be credible, it is intrinsically unstable, fuelling a relentless dynamic of escalation and proliferation, high alert status, and risk of inadvertent or accidental launch. It is predicated on a willingness to incinerate millions of civilians and cause indiscriminate and persistent harm. By definition, this is immoral and incompatible with any civilised, humane, ethical or faith underpinnings. It is anathema to peace.
The world has, however, moved far beyond nuclear deterrence. The policies of nuclear weapons states envisage using their nuclear weapons for political and military purposes to ‘prevail’ in armed conflict. The US, UK, France and Russia have all made explicit threats in recent years to use their nuclear weapons first, preemptively, and against particular countries, including non-nuclear states.

Disarmament is the first step in controlling proliferation to terrorists

Despite some established international safeguards on nuclear and fissile materials, there exists the real possibility of terrorist groups obtaining these materials through either poorly monitored nuclear weapons stockpiles or nuclear facilities in some of the 44 countries with nuclear reactors. The IAEA has recorded over 650 cases of illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and nuclear materials in the last 10 years. Its Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei, warned in 2003, “The present nuclear arms control regime is looking battered. Any reform of that regime must begin by conceiving a framework of collective security that does not rely on nuclear deterrence. The rise of terrorist groups makes this essential.”

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated that although it may be unlikely that terrorists could develop and manage the substantial infrastructure required to produce enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons, “nuclear weapons and weapons materials could be stolen by terrorists either from storage or during transportation.”

Although access to fissile materials is the limiting factor for construction of a terrorist nuclear weapon, were terrorists able acquire fissile material, the manufacture of a nuclear weapon with high reliability of exploding well in the kiloton range would be a relatively simple matter, well within the capability, for example, of university physics or engineering students using information available in the open literature.

The quantities of fissile material – highly enriched uranium or plutonium – required to construct nuclear weapons are well within the uncertainty range of inventory measurement in various types of nuclear facilities, particularly reprocessing plants.

Until nuclear weapons are eliminated, and all fissile material brought under strict international control, the risk of a nuclear-armed terrorist group will remain significant.

Death before detonation

The full extent of the effects of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons are incalculable, both for the workers involved and for the communities exposed through mining, weapons production, testing and nuclear waste. Even in the US, where safety standards may be more rigorously enforced than in some other nations, major environmental and safety violations and widespread nuclear contamination occur.

Over 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted by the five nuclear weapon States between 1945 and 1996. It is estimated that the fallout from testing that was delivered to the world’s population by the year 2000 will cause 430,000 excess cancer deaths.

In all nations which have developed nuclear weapons, the enormous economic costs of these programs have diverted scarce funds away from health care and other essential services. The US program alone was estimated to have cost US$5.5 - 6 trillion from 1940 to 1996. In late 2004, the Natural Resources Defense Council estimated, “Approximately US$40 billion, or about 10% of the annual military budget is spent on US nuclear weapons.”

HOW WOULD YOU REDIRECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FUNDING?


The Millennium Development Goals, set by the United Nations in 2000, were endorsed by virtually all the world’s governments. These goals would require an additional donation of US$60 billion a year in international development assistance by 2015 to achieve:

~ 500 million fewer people in poverty
~ 300 million no longer hungry
~ 30 million fewer under-5 deaths
~ 2 million fewer maternal deaths.

To achieve this, the world would need to commit to US$195 billion annually by 2015, equivalent to just 16% of the current annual global military spending.

Sources:

THE ARMS RACE CAN KILL, THOUGH THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES MAY NEVER BE USED... BY THEIR COST ALONE, ARMAMENTS KILL THE POOR BY CAUSING THEM TO STARVE.

Vatican statement to the UN, 1976
What is the NPT?

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

The NPT is essentially a bargain between those nations with nuclear weapons, who undertake to get rid of them, and those without, who undertake never to acquire them. The Treaty contains, in Article VI, the only existing legally binding and explicit commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear weapon States.

A brief history

The Treaty had its origins in global concerns during the 1960s at the spread of nuclear weapons. The US had developed the first nuclear weapons by 1945. By 1949, the USSR was nuclear armed, followed by the UK in 1952 and France in 1960. China’s first nuclear test in 1964 provided the major impetus to prevent the further spread of these weapons and in 1965 the first draft of the NPT was in circulation.

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapons State (NWS) is defined as one which had “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. This means that only five nations are officially recognized as NWS – the USA, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. These five countries are also the Permanent Five members (P5) of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Treaty was finally open for signature in 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970, having been ratified by the US, USSR and the UK and 40 non-nuclear weapon States. France and China did not join the NPT until 1992. There are currently 188 member states to the NPT.

Only three nations – Israel, India and Pakistan – have never become Parties to the Treaty. Each of them has nuclear weapons. In 2003 North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT and in 2006 conducted its first nuclear weapons test. These four nations are the only ones currently outside the NPT.

The Review Cycle of the NPT

Governments who are Parties to the Treaty meet every five years at a Review Conference at the United Nations in New York to assess the implementation of the Treaty.

Originally intended as a temporary treaty, the NPT was indefinitely extended at the 5th Review Conference in 1995. Since that time, Preparatory Committee meetings are held in each of the three years leading up to the Review Conferences to assist in the work of the Treaty. The Review Conferences aim to produce a consensus document.

The 6th Review Conference in 2000 affirmed the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.” In addition, a set of 13 practical steps towards implementing the Treaty were agreed to (see Appendix 2). All States party to the Treaty must adopt and implement them.

At the NPT Review Conference in 2005, the progress made in 2000 was undermined by a lack of cooperation and an inability to find consensus first on an agenda for the 4-week meeting, then on a final statement. The 13 practical steps agreed on in 2000 were “played down by the nuclear weapon States and not recognized as important commitments.”20 However, efforts to override those commitments failed and these 13 steps remain a critical part of the efforts to maintain and reinvigorate the NPT.

The next Review Conference will be in 2010, with Preparatory Committees in 2007, 2008 and 2009.

The problems inherent in the Treaty

The NPT is by no means an ideal treaty. Some of its key problems and deficiencies are worthy of note.

As outlined previously, the terminology that listed five NWS and leaves all other States termed as non-NWS renders the NPT discriminatory in the eyes of some nations. Mohamed ElBaradei says that in the late 1960s when the NPT negotiations took place, this asymmetrical outcome was the best that could be achieved. In hindsight, he says, the premise that “the early bird gets the nuke” was not optimal, but it was never intended to be permanent.

Furthermore, Article IV of the Treaty outlines the “inalienable right” of all parties to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is increasingly clear that unrestricted access to nuclear technology and nuclear power is incompatible with the abolition of nuclear weapons. Enrichment and reprocessing are the two most sensitive phases of the nuclear fuel chain, as both can yield fissile material directly usable in weapons. Uranium enrichment capacity can be readily used to enrich uranium beyond reactor grade to weapons grade; and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel extracts the plutonium inevitably produced when uranium atoms absorb neutrons inside a reactor.

Countries with nuclear reactors could therefore develop a nuclear weapons capability, though stopping just short of producing a weapon, without breaching the NPT. As noted by nuclear physicist Dr Frank Barnaby in the report “An Illusion of Protection” in 2006, “Using existing and foreseeable safeguards technology, it is not possible for a safeguards agency to detect the diversion of quantities of weapons usable plutonium from a reprocessing plant that could be used to fabricate one or more, or even many, nuclear weapons.”21

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the authority set up to ensure that non-NWS’ nuclear programs remain peaceful. But even with IAEA inspections, distinguishing a military program from...
**What is the NPT?...continued**

A peaceful program may not be easy. The inherent difficulties in Article IV are exemplified by the situation of Iran. As an NPT member, Iran can claim full justification in pursuing uranium enrichment for the production of nuclear energy. In asking Iran to cease uranium enrichment, the IAEA is asking Iran to forgo a “benefit” to which it is entitled as an NPT member – surely an indication that the purpose of this Article is incompatible with the non-proliferation objective of the NPT.

It is time to re-think states “inalienable right” to access to nuclear technology.

**WMDC Recommendation 1:**

“All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the treaty.”

However, even with all its flaws, the NPT is the only treaty by which the leading nuclear powers are explicitly committed to nuclear disarmament, a step that is essential if we are to halt proliferation. Therefore Australia and other parties to the Treaty must act to maintain the integrity of the NPT, and build on it.

We recall the words of US President John F. Kennedy, referring not to the NPT but in calling for support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in June of 1963:

> No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can, if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers, offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

If the entire history of the [hu]mankind were condensed into a single year, our knowledge of how to destroy life on earth with weapons of mass destruction has been acquired in the last thirty seconds. Never again will we lack the knowledge to eliminate the world in a single act of madness. Therefore, we are faced with a dilemma unique in our history. We must not only control the weapons that can kill us, we must bridge the great disparities of wealth and opportunity among the people of the world, the vast majority of whom live in poverty without hope, opportunities of choices in life. These conditions are a breeding ground for division that can cause a desperate people to resort to nuclear weapons as a last resort.

Muhammad Ali
Former Heavyweight Boxing Champion and UN Ambassador for Peace

understanding the NPT ~ a resource from MAPW www.mapw.org.au | 9
Increasingly, the NPT is being seen as a ‘failing treaty’. The lack of progress made at the 2005 Review conference was received with an almost fatalistic resignation by some commentators and analysts. Kevin Rudd, as then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in September 2006, “the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty disintegrates before our very eyes…the current non-proliferation regime is fundamentally fracturing. The consequences of the collapse of this regime for Australia are acute.”

However, the NPT is still a vital treaty and it is imperative that Australia helps to maintain, strengthen and build on the treaty process.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference will be critical in determining prospects for nuclear disarmament. Despite the unequivocal commitment to this end given by the NWS at the 2000 Review Conference, there has been very little action since to implement the 13 action points agreed to at that Review.

Australia’s role in 2010
As a middle power Australia is potentially in a strong position to play a positive role in advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda. While Australia’s position as an ally of some of the nuclear-weapons states might give it some potential leverage with these states, the exercise of such influence appears largely to have been a lost opportunity, particularly in recent years. A stronger argument can be made that Australia’s position as a US ally willing to participate in threats, preparations for, and potential use of nuclear weapons has weakened Australia’s credibility and influence. Australia’s rather lukewarm support for nuclear disarmament can be substantially related to the difficulty of being convincing and consistent while senior Australian officials argue that reliance on a nuclear-armed US ally is critical to Australia’s national security.

Four key aspects for Australia to consider in approaching the 2010 Review Conference will be:

1. Promote a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The creation of a nuclear weapons convention is not only achievable, it is imperative if civilisation is to survive.

Judge Weeramantry, 2007

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix regretted the “serious malaise” in disarmament diplomacy in recent years, and recommended that nuclear weapons be outlawed, identifying the key as “dispelling the perception that outlawing nuclear weapons is a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures. Benchmarks should be set; definitions agreed; timetables drawn up and agreed upon; and transparency requirements agreed. Disarmament work should be set in motion.”

Dr Ron McCoy, former President of IPPNW, summarised the case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in this way,

“A Nuclear Weapons Convention would help to break the deadlock in nuclear disarmament negotiations by bridging the contentious divide between the nuclear weapon states which want non-proliferation first and the non-nuclear weapons states which want disarmament first. …In a humanitarian sense, a Nuclear Weapons Convention would stand for the universal condemnation of weapons of mass destruction and the affirmation of international humanitarian law and the universal code of morality and ethical behaviour. Such a treaty would erase the unconscionable legacy of nuclear weapons for future generations and the threat of their annihilation in a nuclear war.”

A model Nuclear Weapons Convention has been developed. Its purpose is to prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was accepted as a United Nations discussion draft document in 1997.

In 2007, IPPNW and partner organizations launched a revised edition of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention in a publication titled Securing Our Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This updated document reflects the changed security environment since the events of 11 September 2001, and answers critical questions relating to the process of nuclear disarmament. Securing Our Survival is available from the MAPW National Office or online (see: www.icanw.org/securing-our-survival).

Importantly, a Nuclear Weapons Convention would strengthen, not undermine, the NPT. It takes the fundamental undertaking in Article VI of the NPT for nuclear weapon states to disarm their nuclear weapons and lays out a systematic program for achieving this goal. The approach adopted in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention does not suggest a time-bound framework for conclusion of the negotiations or fixed dates for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather it calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations that ought to be concluded in a quick but comprehensive manner.

We have treaties to abolish chemical and biological weapons and landmines. Australia supports all of these, and played an important role in the achievement of the Chemical Weapons Convention. A comprehensive treaty to abolish the worst weapons of terror – nuclear weapons – is long overdue.

essential reading:

Securing Our Survival: the case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

online here: www.icanw.org/securingoursurvival
What is a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

A Nuclear Weapons Convention:

- Defines terms in precise detail to establish thresholds and limits
- Creates rules so that everybody understands what is prohibited and what is allowed
- Establishes a schedule for sequenced steps to remove the threat of nuclear weapons by their dismantlement
- Outlines patterns of behaviour and cooperation that will enhance the communication and transparency in implementing the treaty and those that will arouse suspicion and sanctions
- Establishes verification measures to make sure that no one is cheating

2. Maintaining the integrity of the Treaty

“Australia supports global non-proliferation and disarmament objectives through practical and cooperative measures.”

Dr Brendan Nelson, Australian Minister for Defence

The NPT must not be eroded. In the lead up to the Review in 2010 it will be vital that the NPT is not undermined by threats to withdraw from it, or efforts to stall progress on its core aims. International pressure can be brought to bear on states whose actions threaten the Treaty, but such pressure must be applied impartially if it is to be productive. As the failure of the NWS to disarm remains one of the primary threats to the Treaty, Australia could play a key role in ensuring that the dual roles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are given equal weight in debate and programs of work at all relevant multilateral and bilateral fora in the lead up to the NPT Review.

3. Implementing the 13-Step action plan

The 13-Step action plan developed as part of the final document at the 2000 Review Conference and adopted by all states parties outlined ways forward to achieve the key aims of the NPT. These 13 steps outlined what is accepted as a road map for disarmament. The steps include “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals”. They include also a commitment to speedy entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, and developing verification capabilities to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements. Although the 13-step plan lacks a timeframe, it obliges all state parties to report back on progress towards the implementation of Article VI. None of the NWS have yet reported.

Australia can play a role in strengthening commitment to and progress on these practical steps.

4. Strengthen non-government participation in Australia’s role at the NPT Review Conference and all Preparatory Committee meetings.

Non-government organizations (NGOs) and experts drawn from these groups play a critical role in many international forums, from environmental to human rights and aid negotiations. Participation of NGOs in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament forums can only enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the process. It is also in line with an additional mandate of the 1995 Review Conference to strengthen the accountability process of the NPT.

NGOs bring perspectives sometimes not offered by their governments of the day but which reflect alternative
Thinking in their countries of the issues. They can provide expert opinion and can promote the outcomes of the international fora in ways often not open to the governments or United Nations.

Certain governments include NGO experts on their official delegations to the NPT conferences, recognising the role they play. The Canadian delegation has in the past accepted NGO expertise, for example. To date, no official Australian government NPT delegation has ever had an NGO expert included. However, in recent years there has been increasing interaction between NGO representatives and Australian delegation members and relevant departments, in the lead up to and at the conferences.

Still, current NGO participation in the broader NPT process at the United Nations is mostly informal and depends on a recommendation from the Preparatory Committee and on the goodwill of the Conference President. NGOs have continued to urge action to formalise and extend that participation.

In particular, MAPW strongly recommends that engagement with NGOs both in Australia and by Australian delegations be undertaken more consistently, pro-actively and seriously, and non-government representation be included on Australia’s delegation to all forthcoming NPT conferences and other important UN and other international events.

5. End Australia’s participation in the nuclear fuel chain

Australia has over one third of the world’s known uranium reserves. We currently export uranium to France, the United States and the United Kingdom, all of whom are nuclear weapons states. In 2006, Australia signed nuclear safeguards agreements paving the way for uranium exports to China, a nuclear weapons state with an appalling record of transfer of proliferation-sensitive nuclear expertise, equipment and materials to other countries, notably Pakistan. In China the same organisation manages both military and civilian nuclear facilities, and Chinese leaders have stated that uranium imports are needed to satisfy their combined military and power generation needs. The Australian government allows blanket approval for reprocessing of spent fuel derived from ‘Australian obligated nuclear material’ (the term used because Australian uranium cannot be differentiated or kept separate from other uranium). In July 2007 the Australian government signalled its intent to sell uranium to India, reversing its previous position that Australia would only export uranium to compliant NPT signatory states. The government has also indicated interest in selling uranium to Russia.

A strong and unavoidable connection exists between the use of uranium for civil and military purposes in all nuclear weapon states. In addition, the existing international safeguards system is inadequate at best and deeply flawed in the opinion of many.

In 2006, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and MAPW released a report titled “An Illusion of Protection: the unavoidable limitations of safeguards on nuclear materials and the export of uranium to China”. In the foreword of this report, Frank Barnaby summarises the problem in stark terms,

“The fact is that the IAEA cannot ensure timely detection. If a country decided to divert plutonium or highly enriched uranium from its civil nuclear program to fabricate nuclear weapons, it could assemble nuclear weapons very quickly.”

The report made numerous recommendations, including that:

“Australia should withdraw uranium sales from all Nuclear Weapons States that have breached their non-proliferation obligations, or continue to fail to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty…”; and

“Australia should stop its contribution to the global nuclear chain by phasing out mining and export of uranium.”

The NPT has been a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime for decades, but other treaties carry extremely important obligations also. For example, the Treaty of Rarotonga (the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty) obliges Australia under Article 3:

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

Article IV of the Treaty of Rarotonga states that:

“Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or
(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Any such provisions shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;
(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

It would seem inescapable that Australia is legally obliged not to export uranium to countries that have not signed the NPT. These obligations are made under international law and must not be undermined by the government of the day.
6. Support the Mayors for Peace goal of nuclear weapons abolition by 2020

“We are letting our citizens know that, despite the end of the Cold War, they are still in danger from nuclear weapons, and we mayors are trying to protect them from that danger.”

Mayor Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima and Coordinator of the Mayors for Peace, April 2007

The Mayors for Peace, comprising more than 1,698 member cities in 122 countries and regions around the world, have called on States parties to the NPT to commence negotiations leading to the conclusion of an international treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons by 2010 and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020.

The Mayors for Peace campaign was instigated by Mayor Takeshi Araki of Hiroshima in 1982, at the 2nd UN Special Session on Disarmament held in New York. He proposed a new Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities Toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, a way for cities to transcend national borders and work together for nuclear weapons abolition. Subsequently, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki called on mayors around the world to support this program.

In April 2007 Hiroshima’s Mayor Akiba spoke at the launch of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, stating,

“If IPPNW doctors around the world became determined to mobilize and inspire their mayors to take this campaign seriously, and if the mayors were inspired to communicate the campaign to their people, this would be one of the most rapid and effective ways to generate a groundswell of grassroots support for the elimination of the obscene and obsolete nuclear threat.”

A number of Australian local governments have joined the campaign, but many more need encouragement to do so. Much more action is required at a federal parliamentary level to support the goal of nuclear weapons elimination by 2020. For more information, see: www.mayorsforpeace.org.

Nuclear weapons are Illegal

In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that:

The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Australia and nuclear weapons

Cabinet papers released in recent years confirm Australian Governments’ interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in the post-war period and indeed Australia’s initial reluctance to sign the NPT.

Prime Minister Menzies favoured the acquisition of nuclear weapons from our allies the US or the UK but negotiations to this end were unsuccessful. Prime Minister John Gorton, who succeeded him in 1968, wished instead for Australia to develop its own nuclear weapons. A nuclear reactor at Jervis Bay in NSW (on Commonwealth land) for power production was announced, and work began at the site, but an Australian nuclear weapons capacity was clearly on the agenda. However with pressure from within his Cabinet for Australia to preserve its international image by supporting the NPT, Gorton did eventually and reluctantly sign the Treaty in 1971, while making it clear that Australia’s signature without ratification was not binding.

Subsequent economic analyses rendered the reactor project unachievable, and Gorton’s successor William McMahon shelved the Jervis Bay project and with it the plans for nuclear power and a nuclear weapons capability. Australia’s ratification of the NPT did not come until 23 January 1973 under Prime Minister Whitlam.

Australia’s role as an NPT member has been a mixed bag, undoubtedly coloured by our alliance with the world’s superpower, and almost certainly by our desire to maximise our uranium sales. There is little doubt that the latter have fuelled nuclear weapons proliferation. Australia’s speech to the 2003 NPT Preparatory Committee was seen by some as focusing too heavily on facilitating the development and transfer of nuclear technology for ‘peaceful purposes’ through safeguards, rather than on the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Despite the pressure to export, Australia has made valuable contributions, which must not be overlooked. The report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was a landmark contribution to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Successive governments have worked hard to implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which Foreign Minister Alexander Downer brought to the UN General Assembly in 1996) and, we have promoted steps such as the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Important though these steps are, we could implement all of them and still live in a heavily nuclear-armed world. A key element has been missing. That element is the commitment to advance both non-proliferation and disarmament by abolishing nuclear weapons. Those nations with the weapons must get rid of them. Those nations without must remain without. Stocks of fissile materials should be subject to the most stringent international security in the meantime.

While the Australian government pays lip service to the responsibilities of the existing nuclear powers to disarm, our strongest words and actions – including the strongest action a nation can take, invasion of another - have been reserved for those who challenge the nuclear apartheid.

Successive Australian governments have maintained the rather confused policy that nuclear weapons elimination is necessary – eventually – but in the meantime US nuclear weapons help keep the peace. We remain a willing accomplice to the nuclear weapons policies of the world’s military superpower. Australia is thereby willing to countenance use of nuclear weapons, be party to their use, and potentially contribute to the radioactive incineration of millions of people. Australia could instead lead the way in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons by rejecting the US nuclear umbrella rather than supporting or relying on it.

The measure of Australia’s contribution to the 2010 NPT Review will be the degree to which we demand and work for major concrete, verifiable, transparent and irreversible progress by the nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals to zero.

“We cannot allow weapons of mass destruction to remain in the hands of a country which in the past has demonstrated a willingness to use those weapons.”

Prime Minister John Howard, 9 November 2002
The important role of parliamentarians

“One of the advantages of our technological age is that people can make their political voice heard and governments have no choice but to listen or fall. Significant expressions of public concern both in quality and quantity can spur governments to increase funding and take action in response.”

Senator Roméo Dallaire, Canada, 2007

The issue of nuclear weapons transcends party political boundaries. No security issue is of more far-reaching significance than the elimination of these instruments of terror.

The Hon. Douglas Roche, in an address at the UN in October 2004 sponsored by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, said,

“My experience, having followed the NPT closely for 20 years ……tells me that the only way to stop the erosion of the NPT is for a new burst of energy to be shown by middle power states……to shore up and influence the centre position in the nuclear weapons debate.

Speaking up takes courage and leadership. Parliamentarians possess both these attributes. You also have access to the decision-making processes of your governments. I appeal to you to make your voices heard……

“…Is your loyalty to your nuclear weapons friends greater than your loyalty to sparing humanity from a nuclear catastrophe?”

The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament is a global network of more than 500 parliamentarians in 70 countries (including Australia) which provides invaluable information (www.pnnd.org).

Australian parliamentarians can help ensure that the abolition of nuclear weapons is promoted with vigour in international forums such as at the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review conferences.

The important role of civil society

In 1994, while considering the question of the legal status of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice, for the first time in its history, accepted material from a citizens’ delegation, in the form of millions of “declarations of public conscience”. This was in acknowledgement of the strength of public condemnation of nuclear weapons, and in recognition of the 1907 Hague Convention, the preamble of which refers to “the dictates of the public conscience” as a factor providing protection in times of war. On the issue of nuclear weapons, the public conscience demands abolition.

There is increasing recognition and appreciation of the important role representatives of civil society play in major forums. For example a UN report in 2002 stated:

“The extensive interaction of civil society actors … has really blossomed with the world conferences of the past decade. The formal deliberations and decisions of many such meetings are now often enriched by the debates carried out in non-governmental forums and events held in parallel with official conferences. Many United Nations treaty bodies now routinely consider alternate reports from non-governmental organizations alongside the official reports from Governments. In some cases, non-governmental organizations have addressed plenary sessions of conferences and participated in formal, round-table discussions with governmental delegates. Many Governments now include civil society representatives in their delegations to international conferences and special sessions, and sometimes also to the General Assembly.”

Many professions and sectors have particular contributions to make to the achievement of nuclear weapons abolition. They include diverse fields such as the law, education, economics, behavioural and social sciences, physics, atmospheric and environmental science, engineering, philosophy and ethics. Other sectors such as faith-based organisations, peace, social justice and environmental organisations, and many others also play a vital role. We consider as one of many possible example, the contribution of health professionals.

The important role of health professionals

“I am a retired obstetrician. For 40 years, I nurtured each unique pregnancy so that a healthy baby would be born at the end of nine months. It was such a privilege and a life-affirming experience to be present at the beginning of so many lives. I believe those babies, all babies and their fathers and mothers, and babies yet unborn, deserve to live in a safer world, without nuclear weapons.”

Dr Ron McCoy, Former President of IPPNW

Health care workers have professional, ethical obligations established and affirmed over millennia. These are not only to do their utmost to care for the sick, relieve suffering, treat and where possible cure illness for individual patients, but also to work to prevent illness, suffering and death by addressing their causes. They are obliged to engage with their societies to create the optimal conditions for the health of individuals and communities, to remove barriers to health and promote conditions which enhance health, without fear or favour.

Physicians first confronted the horrors of nuclear war in 1945 following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1950’s and early 1960s physicians played a key role in the debate over atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons and the health effects of radioactive fallout. In the 1970s physicians began to discuss ideas to foster medical cooperation between physicians of the two superpowers in order to spearhead a worldwide movement away from nuclear disaster. For their efforts during the early 1980s, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War was awarded the Nobel Peace Price in 1985.

Health professionals can speak with authority on the health effects of nuclear war and are experts and persuasive advocates on issues related to public health. Physicians and health workers can play a leading role in building broad public support for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
If nuclear weapons are abolished, a risk will remain that terrorists will develop a nuclear weapon, or that a nation might cheat on its non-proliferation commitments. However the maintenance of nuclear weapons by a handful of countries is useless in preventing either of these possibilities. In fact, a nuclear armed world is worse than useless against terrorists. It increases the risk of terrorists getting hold of a nuclear weapon or the technology and raw materials with which to make one. And, no matter how many nuclear weapons exist, terrorists will not be deterred by them.

Similarly the risk that a nation might secretly “break-out” by developing a nuclear arsenal is much greater now than it would be if nuclear weapons abolition were negotiated and implemented. In a nuclear weapons free world, the power and political status currently enjoyed by the nuclear weapons states would be replaced by pariah status, and the incentives for nations to acquire nuclear weapons would be far less. In addition, intensive inspection and verification regimes and other measures would go a long way to maintaining a nuclear weapons free world. They would dramatically reduce the incentives for break-out and the chances of it succeeding. Preventing the development of one nuclear weapon will be tremendously easier in a world which has achieved zero nuclear weapons status.

The relevant question for us to ask is whether we would be safer in a world that proceeds to nuclear weapons abolition than we are now. The answer is decisively yes.

While nuclear weapons cannot be “dis-invented”, neither can biological and chemical weapons. Yet the world has outlawed these weapons. Similarly, slavery was not un-invented but it was outlawed. Humanity must choose what sort of world we wish to live in and leave for our descendants.
ICAN takes action!

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) was launched in 2007 by MAPW and IPPNW in response to the disastrous outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. At the launch of the campaign, former President of IPPNW, Dr Ron McCoy explained,

“When we gathered in New York in May 2005 for the NPT Review Conference, we witnessed the shredding of past agreements on nuclear disarmament and the NPT floundered in a sea of bad faith. That travesty of diplomacy stimulated IPPNW to re-examine the NPT process and conclude that it was time to think outside the NPT box and explore other avenues to abolition, parallel to and complementing the NPT process.”

ICAN focuses on the roots of the nuclear weapons problem - the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a small minority of countries, who risk their use by design, accident, miscalculation or by terrorists, and whose weapons are an incentive to others to also become nuclear armed.

The campaign aims to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention to ban the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons.

ICAN will work to generate the required political will through education, research and advocacy, by working with mayors, parliamentarians, lawyers, the public and decision-makers, to convince them that nuclear abolition, through a Nuclear Weapons Convention, is feasible, practical, verifiable, enforceable and achievable.

Can you imagine a world without nuclear weapons? ICAN!

ICAN invites you to join us in working towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

A broad citizen’s movement is needed to challenge those countries that possess the world’s most suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal weapons and to put nuclear abolition back at the top of the international political agenda.

It is vital that our work for disarmament remains positive and solutions focused rather than alarmist and fear-generating. While this is a grave serious issue, we must retain hope, and even laughter, to overcome desensitisation or psychic numbing and to motivate action.

ICAN asks you to:

Educate yourself

Our website provides up-to-date compelling information about nuclear problems and solutions, with news, maps, country profiles, testimony from survivors of the nuclear age, poll results and a history of the anti-nuclear peace movement. www.ICANw.org

Involve your networks

Doctors and other health professionals will increase their collaboration with other key sectors, such as mayors, lawyers, parliamentarians and environmental and human rights advocates. Together we can build a truly global, coordinated strong, credible and united nuclear disarmament network. Your organisation can become an ICAN partner.

Help to motivate the community

The horror of nuclear weapons can make us feel helpless. However the task of abolishing them is not only imperative but also achievable. History is littered with examples of well-entrenched and monumental challenges that have been overcome, such as slavery, South Africa’s apartheid and the stand off of the Cold War.

The goal of abolishing nuclear weapons is not naive. It is in fact naive to believe that these weapons can make us secure, or that they can be retained without ever being used again.

There is nothing pre-ordained about our future. Jonathan Schell reminds us that whether nuclear weapons are “merely a monstrous leftover from a frightful era that has ended” or “seeds of a new, more virulent era” is not a matter of prediction, but a matter of choice.

Raise your voice

Join us in the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons through a binding, comprehensive international treaty - a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Appendix 1: treaty text
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


Entry into force generally: 5 March 1970

Entry into force for Australia: 23 January 1973

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”,

CONSIDERING the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

BELIEVING that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

IN CONFORMITY with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

UNDERTAKING to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

EXPRESSING their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

AFFIRMING the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

CONVINCED that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

DECLARING their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

URGING the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

RECALLING the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

DESIRING to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

RECALLING that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material for the processing use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

**Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

**Article V**

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapons States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

**Article VI**

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**Article VII**

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

**Article VIII**

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of...
Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

I. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized it supreme interests.

II. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty, DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

Appendix 1: treaty text continued

The second nuclear era, unlike the dawn of the first nuclear age in 1945, is characterized by a world of porous national borders, rapid communications that facilitate the spread of technical knowledge, and expanded commerce in potentially dangerous dual-use technologies and materials.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
January 2007
Appendix 2: 13 point action plan

At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, all governments signed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed to the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive achievement of nuclear disarmament.

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
   - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
   - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
   - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
   - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
   - A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
   - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Footnotes:

4. Ibid, pg32.
19. Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, Article IX, see appendix 1
22. Kennedy, President John F, Commencement Address at American University, Washington, USA, 10 June 1963.
30. as at 30 July 2007, according to the website www.mayorsforpeace.org.
31. Australia has sold uranium to nuclear-armed France, to Finland (in full knowledge that plutonium could be extracted from the spent fuel in Soviet military facilities), to South Korea when it appeared likely that that country would embark on a nuclear weapons program, and to European Economic Community members who were at liberty to transfer the uranium to other buyers without Australia’s consent.
32. The CTBT has not yet entered into force. It will do so when 44 named states which are engaged in nuclear research or nuclear power ratify the Treaty.
37. These measures are extensively addressed in the report of The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
More information on nuclear weapons

Medical Association for Prevention of War www.mapw.org.au
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons www.icanw.org
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War www.ippnw.org
Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA) www.psr.org
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission www.wmdcommission.org
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists www.thebulletin.org
Reaching Critical Will www.reachingcriticalwill.org
Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament www.pnnd.org
Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk
Energy/Science Coalition www.energyscience.org.au
Federation of American Scientists www.fas.org
Natural Resources Defense Council www.nrdc.org
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute www.sipri.org

Abbreviations

ACF Australian Conservation Foundation
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICJ International Court of Justice
IPPNW International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
MAPW Medical Association for Prevention of War
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NPT nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWS nuclear weapon State/s
Non-NWS non-nuclear weapon State/s
NWC Nuclear Weapons Convention
PS Permanent Five (of the UN Security Council)
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDC Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
UN United Nations

I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.

Albert Einstein
Nuclear war is inevitable, 
say the pessimists;

Nuclear war is impossible, 
say the optimists;

Nuclear war is inevitable 
unless we make it impossible, 
say the realists.

Sydney J. Harris