



China, profits and power

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In 1986 Dr Middleton was a founding member of the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition. In addition to her ongoing campaign work since then with the Anti-Bases Campaign she has had a wide range of activist interests including: human rights work with Aboriginal communities and being an active member of Bougainville Freedom Movement.

She has also been a key player in the Blue paper project, a national campaign to stimulate public awareness and to change government policy on Australia's security and defence.

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Australia and the US National Missile Defence System

Let's be frank. The target of the US Star Wars program, now renamed National Missile Defence (NMD), is China.

NMD is not a benign, defensive nuclear umbrella. It is a controversial space battle system, an offensive program which aims to provide a shield behind which the US could fire its nuclear arsenal at an enemy. In other words, it is intended to allow the US to attack other countries with impunity, without fear of retaliation. The Pentagon claims that NMD is defensive, but the US Space Command is committed to space "control and domination".

The Space Command has released Vision for 2020, a joint initiative that combines US Army, Navy and Air Forces in a unified command to dominate "the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment..." The program's most important and influential proponents are defense contractors who will make billions of dollars if it goes ahead.

NMD will destroy the existing international arms control and disarmament regime, provoke a new nuclear arms race, trigger a wave of destabilising events around the world, and once more open up the prospect of nuclear war.

On July 18, in a joint statement following their meeting, China's President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "the essence of the US plan to create a national anti-missile system ... is a striving for unilateral superiority in the military field and in security issues."

The plan would pose "the most grave adverse consequences" for "security and international strategic stability", the two leaders stated.

The United States has been engaged in research on national missile defense (NMD) technologies for several decades - the idea was first raised during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson more than 35 years ago.

Australia has been deeply involved for some time through the US military facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

George Bush is using NMD as a political ploy against his rival Al Gore in the lead up to the Presidential elections. The Clinton administration has moved a long way towards deployment because going into the November elections without a NMD position would leave the Democrats vulnerable to Republican criticisms that they are soft on defence. In 1996, under pressure from Congressional Republicans who wanted the NMD deployed by 2003, the Clinton administration changed its research and development program to a "deployment readiness" program.

The administration took another step in this direction when Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that the projected defence budget up to 2005 would include funds for actual deployment -- not just research and development.



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Finally, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, signed by Clinton in July, states that it is US policy to deploy a limited NMD system "as soon as technologically feasible." Thus, a negative decision will simply be to delay deployment until an unspecified date in the future.

As the peace movement has argued for decades, indeed since the first nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the only answer to the nuclear threat is to abolish nuclear weapons.

What are NMD and TMD?

The missile defence system involved developing the technology and hardware to intercept in flight a limited number of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads.

The plan calls for the deployment of 20 interceptor missiles, probably in Alaska, along with five upgraded early warning radars, all to be ready for use by 2005 with 80 more being deployed two years later. The Pentagon also intends to deploy a new space-based missile launch detection system to replace current early warning satellites. This could also be ready by 2005. A space based infrared system to track missiles through their entire flight and guide interceptors to their target is also in the Star Wars plan. The National Missile Defence program is planned to cover mainland USA. Theatre Missile Defence is intended for US forces overseas and US allies - Japan and Taiwan have been mentioned.

I do not intend to go any further into the technical details here. For those of you who are interested in this aspect, I have included some additional material in appendices to my paper.

The Australian connection

Pine Gap

The Australian Government has indicated that it will support the use of Pine Gap for the US National Missile Defence system - even though the government does not know what it is supporting.

US Defence Secretary William Cohen said in Australia on 16 July that Pine Gap had been "very much" involved in NMD since October 1999.

Yet two days later on 18 July, Alexander Downer said the Australian Government did not know if Pine Gap had been involved in national missile Defence tests - an astonishing statement by the Foreign Minister of an ostensibly sovereign state.

The parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties said in 1999 that MPs were kept in the dark about information that was given to the US Congress or was publicly available. Members complained that although US Congress officials had visited Pine Gap and received classified briefings about its functions, the Treaties Committee was "entrusted with less information than can be found in a public library".

The Labor Party has been critical of NMD and supported a Senate resolution introduced by the Democrats on June 29, which calls on the US not to deploy NMD.



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However, ALP opposition is clearly cautious and qualified. Labor Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laurie Brereton, and Shadow Minister for Defence, Stephen Martin, said in a media statement on 17 July:

"Labor in government will very carefully review the issue of possible Australian involvement in the NMD program through the role of the Satellite Relay Ground Station".

The Satellite Relay Ground Station at Pine Gap, which replaces the US base at Nurrungar, controls the US Defence Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites.

Defence Secretary Cohen's admission that Pine Gap had been "very much" involved in NMD since October 1999 was less than the full truth for Pine Gap will be the front line of the planned tracking and missile defence network. In addition, it was a total fabrication historically, Pine Gap has been used to collect data on missile launches for over 30 years. The satellites it controls monitor missile telemetry and the exhaust plumes of missiles. These two pieces of information reveal the type of missile, its range, speed, trajectory and number of warheads - all of which is crucial information if missiles are to be shot down with a Star Wars style system.

Over the years Pine Gap has quietly been converted into a front-line base for the controversial National Missile Defence system. During a May 1992 visit, then US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney (now George Bush's presidential running mate) confirmed that the US bases in Australia would play a role in the Strategic Defence Initiative or "Star Wars".

The Keating Government agreed to collaborate with the US in developing the newer version of Star Wars, the NMD program.

(More detailed information on Pine Gap is included in the appendices)

Project Dundee

In 1995 Australia co-operated with the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO) in a research project involving sensor, tracking and communications technologies and US rocket firings from Woomera.

In September 1997 four ballistic missiles were fired from a secret coastal site between Broome and Port Hedland in the north of WA. They were tracked by a range of terrestrial and space based sensors, including Australia's Jindalee over-the-horizon radar, as they travelled at high speed, landing in the ocean.

The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) co-operated with the US Department of Defense BMDO in this test which was codenamed Project Dundee (Down Under Early Warning Experiment).

In a press release dated 8 August 1997, the then Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlan, said:

"The aim of Project DUNDEE is to investigate the possibility of detecting missile launches in their 'boost phase' immediately after launch.... "Early detection is important in developing defence against



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theatre ballistic missiles which travel relatively short distances - typically 300-500 kilometres - and take only a short time to reach their targets."

In a public report a senior DSTU researcher, Dr David Cartwright, said the research "complements Australia's long standing co-operation in the US missile early warning program. "The program is aimed at developing a defence against theatre ballistic missiles," he said.

Last month, Flight International reported that the US and Australia planned to build a major testing facility north of Broome in WA.

Peter La Franchi, author of the Flight International report, said: "Since 1996 the Americans have been looking for a site somewhere in the world scarce enough of human beings to allow a basic experiment to take place. Can a warship shoot down a missile over land just minutes after the launch?"

The new range would allow the US Navy to stake a larger claim in the "Star Wars" plan by testing ship-based anti-missile systems. Simulated ballistic missiles would be launched from Australia, and - if the tests succeeded - quickly be shot down by the US Navy.

During a doorstep interview in Perth on July 25, Mr Beazley said: "No, I don't have a problem with it. It's very important to separate these two issues: tactical missile defence of the fleet and of warships, which we've been actively engaged in developing solutions to for a considerable period of time, and the national missile defence system ... We do have problems with that, particularly what it would do to international arms control agreements and we would not want to see Australia caught up in it. But it's a totally separate issue."

Given all the facts, Labor Leader Beazley's statements in support of the missile test site are either grossly ill informed or disingenuous.

Navy spokesman Colin Blair said Australia was focused on learning to destroy surface skimming missiles at the east coast firing range in Jervis Bay.

Interoperability and military dollars

The "understanding" of US missile defence plans expressed by the Howard Government reflects the support for the US alliance which has included both Labor and Liberal Parties throughout the last half century.

The ALP has criticised NMD - but with some significant qualifications. The party's stated willingness to consider the role of the Satellite Relay Ground Station at Pine Gap and Mr Beazley's specious distinction - which no one else makes - between national and theatre missile defence do not create confidence that Labor in government would stand up to the USA and try to keep Australia out of Star Wars.

There is a further price to be paid by the Australian people for the US alliance. During his recent visit to give us our orders, US Defence Secretary Cohen stated that the US "expects" Australia to be "very much involved" in the US missile defence system and to increase military spending.



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Cohen said Australia needed to boost its defence spending to make sure its forces were on a par with the US in case of future joint missions.

The US has planned a role for Australian forces in any conflict in North Asia - and again that means China. But this is not in our interests and more arms will make Australia poorer, not safer.

The deal signed during Cohen's visit giving Australia access to American military technology does not inspire confidence in the current community consultation process on defence spending. If the Government is signing deals with the United States, will they really listen to our voices?

Australia cannot afford a continued cold war paradigm which defines regional engagement as interoperability with the United States in potential high intensity conflicts.

This would require expanding strategic strike and force projection capabilities, maintaining a 'knowledge edge' over regional states and remaining a substantial maritime power. Australia simply cannot afford such an approach economically, politically and socially.

More arms will make Australia poorer, not safer.

No real threat

The Pentagon claims that the NMD program is intended to counter potential threats from so-called "rogue states," or, as the US State Department now calls them, "states of concern".

So far the countries named have been North Korea, Iran and Iraq, with the more recent additions in media coverage of Libya and Syria, presumably in response to the need to ensure there are enough "rogues" around to constitute a credible threat requiring the expenditure of so many billions of dollars.

The threat is vastly overstated - perhaps not surprisingly, given the past record of the US intelligence community to greatly exaggerate or blatantly lie about the actual and potential military capabilities of the chosen enemy of the time.

Any country which launched a missile attack against the United States would know that it faced national suicide - not a highly popular policy choice.

Of the named "rogue" states, only North Korea could conceivably field an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the US, but it has not yet tested a missile-with-warhead that is capable of doing so and it currently does not have a missile capable of reaching the United States.

More importantly, the North Korean Government announced in June that it was extending its self-imposed ban on missile testing and that flight testing would remain on hold while negotiations with the United States continue.

Russian defense minister Marshall Igor Sergeev commented: "As far as we know, North Korea has no intention of forcing the United States to its knees."



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A leaked discussion paper prepared by the State Department's senior advisor on arms control and international security affairs, John Holum, admits that the so-called "rogue" states might be willing to scrap their weapons programs in return for aid. "In our approaches to North Korea with regard to both issues of proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies, we have found that positive incentives can be effective," the State Department paper says.

Destruction of arms control and disarmament treaties

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed by the USA and the USSR and entered into force in 1972. Amended in a Protocol in 1974, it is now in force for the USA and for Russia as the legal successor to the USSR.

The ABM treaty enshrines the principle that missile defences are destabilising and a stimulus to the nuclear arms race.

The treaty obligates the USA and Russia not to build a nation-wide defence system against strategic ballistic missile attack and severely limits the development and deployment of permitted missile defences. Among other provisions, it prohibits giving air-defence missiles, radars or launchers the technical capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or from testing them in a strategic ABM mode.

The testing and deployment of the systems currently under development by the USA threaten to undermine the integrity of the ABM as one of the cornerstones of the strategic nuclear balance.

United States representatives are becoming increasingly strident in their attacks on the ABM, calling it outmoded and demanding that the US withdraw from it.

Republican Senator Jesse Helms, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, has said: "If I succeed, we will defeat the ABM Treaty, toss it into the dustbin of history and thereby clear the way to build a national missile defense."

The consequence of this is likely to be the collapse of all existing arms control and nuclear disarmament treaties. The fragile foundation for recent progress in nuclear disarmament will come crashing down.

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently told the Russian parliament that if, "the US proceeds to destroy the 1972 ABM Treaty ... we can and will withdraw not only from the START II Treaty ... but from the whole system of treaty relations having to do with the limitation and control of strategic and conventional arms."

Chinese arms control ambassador Sha Zukang, told the Washington Post: "Any amendment, or abolishing of the treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament now between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt multilateral disarmament as well."

New nuclear arms race

There were hopes that the strategic nuclear balance of the cold war era could be wound back with balanced disarmament agreements.



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There was a chance that the insanity of MAD (mutually assured destruction) - the concept that it is in nobody's interests to attack an enemy with nuclear weapons, because of the certainty that the enemy will be able to respond in kind even after its civilisation is devastated - could be ended once and for all.

But a nuclear shield, in theory, nullifies this response. It makes nuclear war a strategic alternative, as it was in 1945 when only the US had the bomb.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that "instead of protecting itself and eliminating the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the move will breed a real missile boom and shatter accords that limit and destroy weapons. In other words, world security will be undermined, and it will all be America's doing".

Mr. Sha Zukang, Director-General of arms control in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, has said the US proposal would spark a global arms race and the "nightmare scenario" of weapons proliferation.

Even the CIA has warned that deployment of a national missile defence scheme could trigger a regional arms race by raising insecurity in the region.

Both Russia and China have repeatedly warned that US plans for a National Missile Defense will lead the world into a new nuclear arms race. Both countries have pledged to meet any US Star Wars scheme by building up their nuclear forces.

If China builds up its nuclear forces to counter Star Wars, India and then Pakistan, are likely to follow suit.

We are on the brink of a new, more dangerous nuclear arms race.

The decision by the United States to deploy its National Missile Defence program will also force Russia and China to retain their nuclear weapons on high-alert - making the world a more dangerous place.

There are almost 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Thousands of these are on hair-trigger alert, ready to launch on a moment's notice, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

In addition, the US in January secretly raised with Russia the idea of maintaining its highly dangerous "launch-on-warning" nuclear strategy. The US also abandoned earlier proposals to Russia for further big cuts in the size of nuclear arsenals.

These drastic and dangerous steps are designed to win Russian acceptance of the National Missile Defence plan.

Astronomical cost

The United States has spent over \$60 billion on national missile defense since Ronald Reagan unveiled the scheme in his infamous 1984 "Star Wars" speech - but it has little to show for it.

The test record is marked with more failures than successes, yet the United States government continues to pour more money into "Star Wars." It is the most expensive weapons project attempted by the Pentagon. Some experts estimate that the US will



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have to spend another \$60 billion for the NMD system currently being researched and tested by the Pentagon.

The Council for a Livable World and the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers estimate that the cost of the preferred Republican option of a layered defense would total at least \$120 billion by 2015.

The huge investment in TMD is a criminal waste of resources. There are far better ways in which the resources could be used, which would go much further to building a cooperative and peaceful world.

It wont work

In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson proposed a system called Sentinel. Richard Nixon wanted one called Safeguard. Ronald Reagan's 1983 version was nicknamed Star Wars. All were abandoned chiefly because they did not work and cost astronomical amounts of money.

Tests of the technology of the latest version, NMD, are also not encouraging so far. In fact, since research on so-called hit-to kill weapons began in 1976, attempts to destroy mock warheads have failed more than 70 per cent of the time.

And in the real world, during the Gulf War, not one Patriot anti-ballistic missile managed to hit a Scud. The US record was so poor that it featured in an episode of the recent TV series Great Military Blunders.

Second, any country capable of developing a ballistic missile that could reach the United States could also develop countermeasures, such as decoys, that could foil NMD.

Third, terrorists or "rogue states" (if such things really exist) would deliver their chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads in a container or a suitcase. The multi-billion dollar Star Wars scheme will be completely useless against the most likely threat to the USA - a truck or boat carrying explosives.

Fourth, states would be likely to build larger nuclear arsenals to increase their chances of simply overwhelming the NMD.

The reality is that greater efforts for nuclear abolition and arms control are the only protection against such threats - but the US clearly does not have the political will or commitment to achieve this.

Who wants it?

Very few people or countries want NMD. There is world wide hostility and resistance. The basis of much of the international opposition to NMD is the understanding that if one country - the USA - should ever achieve a successful missile defence (or believe that it had), it would have a strong incentive to launch a pre-emptive strike against its opponents before they too achieved such a defence.

The recent meeting of ASEAN, the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in Japan, the United Nations Secretary General, the European Union, Germany, France, Sweden, Russia, China, the Non-Aligned movement, and 50 US Nobel prize winners have all spoken out strongly against NMD.



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From the "Contract with America" in 1994, Republicans have tried to make an issue of "protecting the homeland" from missile attack. In the 1998 elections, their campaign to build public support for national missile defense was unsuccessful. Every Republican presidential candidate in the 2000 elections, however, has promised to deploy a national missile defense.

Despite Republican efforts, national missile defense is not a priority for the public. A July 1999 poll shows that while a majority of Americans support missile defense in principle, it is not a high priority even among defense issues, which are themselves a low priority.

However, the US military industrial complex undoubtedly wants it.

With \$12.7 billion already committed if a decision to deploy is made and the likely expenditure of tens of billions more, defense contractors are lobbying for the system.

Their lobbying includes donations to the campaigns of candidates, both for the presidency and for Congress, which will provide funding for any system. According to data compiled by the non-partisan Center for Responsive Politics, Boeing, the lead contractor for the missile defense program, has given over \$290,000 to federal candidates by February this year. The total may well be much higher now.

Raytheon, which is building the kill vehicle, and Lockheed Martin, the lead contractor for SBIRS High, one of the proposed systems' satellite components, have both made large donations to election 2000 campaigns. Lockheed Martin is the third largest corporate contributor in the country.

I would like to conclude by repeating a point I made at the beginning of this paper: As the peace movement has argued for decades, indeed since the first nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the only answer to the nuclear threat is to abolish nuclear weapons.



Appendices

Appendix 1: National Missile Defence

Although the exact architecture of the proposed NMD system is not yet finalized, its general shape is clear, and the components of the system have been chosen. The system will use ground-based interceptors topped with an Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that is designed to destroy the incoming warhead by colliding with it at high speed. This collision would take place above the atmosphere, when the warhead is in the mid-course of its trajectory.

The launch of an attacking missile would first be detected by US early warning satellites. The existing satellites, known as DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites, use infrared sensors to detect the hot plume of a missile booster in the early stage of its flight. Beginning in 2004, the DSP satellites will be replaced by a new system of early warning satellites known as SBIRS-high (Space-Based Infrared System--high-earth orbit), which will also use infrared sensors to detect missile plumes but have improved capabilities.

The data from the early warning satellites would be fed to the NMD Battle Management Center, to be located at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado.

Once the booster finishes burning, the NMD system would use different sensors to detect the missile and any objects it releases, to track these objects accurately enough to guide the interceptors, and to discriminate the real warhead from decoys or other false targets.

These sensors include five existing early-warning radars, in Massachusetts, California, central Alaska, Greenland, and Britain, which will be upgraded to give them the ability to track targets accurately enough to guide interceptors. In addition, new X-band radars designed specifically for NMD and with much greater discrimination capabilities will be deployed. These ground-based radars will be supplemented by a space-based system of roughly 24 SBIRS-low (Space-Based Infrared System--low-earth orbit) missile-tracking satellites that are designed to provide track data accurate enough to guide interceptors without assistance from other sensors.

At some point in this process, the system must discriminate the actual warhead from the other objects. Otherwise, the NMD system--with a limited number of interceptors--would risk simply running out of interceptors if it attempted to fire at all the objects. Because the NMD interceptors are designed to intercept their targets above the atmosphere, where there is no air resistance and where lightweight objects travel on the same trajectory as a heavy warhead, the system would be particularly vulnerable to countermeasures that use numerous lightweight decoys.

The NMD Battle Management Center would integrate the information from the various sensors and decide which objects the system should try to intercept. The NMD system would then launch interceptors and guide them towards their targets. An In-Flight Interceptor Communications Systems (IFICS), which will consist of several ground stations deployed at forward locations, would relay communications from the battle-management center to interceptors that have flown over the horizon.

As each interceptor nears its assigned target, it would release the EKV, which will use infrared and visible light sensors to detect the target and attempt to discriminate it from



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decoys or other false targets. Finally, the EKV would home on the target and use thruster rockets to steer itself into the target.

To increase its odds of success, the NMD system would likely fire several interceptors at each target. To conserve interceptors, if time permits, the defense would use a shoot-look-shoot strategy, in which one or more interceptors are fired at the target, and after observing the results of the intercept attempts, additional interceptors are fired if necessary. Current plans reportedly call for firing four interceptors at each target.

The United States plans to build the NMD in three stages, with the capability of the system designed to increase in each stage. The first system configuration--dubbed the "capability-1" or "C-1" system--is designed to defend against an attack of a "few, simple" warheads. This initial system would be augmented to provide a "capability-2" or "C-2" system, designed to defend against a "few, complex" warheads. The stated goal of the NMD program is to deploy a "capability-3" or "C-3" system, designed to defend against "many, complex" warheads. The term "few" refers to five or fewer warheads. The C-3 System is designed to be compatible with further expansions, such as more interceptors, more interceptor sites, and/or space-based lasers (a small R&D program on space-based lasers is ongoing).

The initial site will be either Grand Forks, North Dakota or central Alaska. The site not chosen for initial deployment would likely be used as a second site for the C-3 system. The Clinton administration has indicated it is leaning strongly towards an initial deployment in Alaska.

The exoatmospheric kill vehicle is the star of the Clinton plan, a 130-pound wonder just 54 inches long. It is made by Raytheon at a plant in Tucson. In space, it would guide itself toward the target, its tiny computer analyzing sensor readings and firing thrusters.

Its big challenge is to disregard the decoys amid the nuclear warheads, which the sensor tracks through their heat rays and sees as twinkling points of light, like stars.

Zippering along at about two miles per second, the kill vehicle is to slam into the nuclear warhead in space and demolish it by force of impact.

Antimissile designers praise the kill vehicle as the apex of miniaturization and accuracy. By contrast, they say, the world's first successful hit-to-kill interceptor, in 1984, had to unfurl a 15-foot-wide steel umbrella to raise the odds of collision.

Donald R. Baucom, an antimissile historian at the Pentagon, said the new kill vehicle's deadly agility is rooted in its miniaturized parts and light weight -- pounds versus earlier tons. So firings of its four small thrusters produce fast maneuvers.

Still, even its staunchest backers acknowledge that the kill vehicle is blind to enemy warheads for most of its flight. Raytheon, its maker, says it can pick up the telltale heat emanations of targets only in the last 100 or so seconds before impact.

So the weapon must still rely on radars and satellites to find its quarry. The needed helpers, detailed in April in a Congressional Budget Office report, and in interviews with its author, Geoffrey Forden, include these:



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- Early-warning radars. Five existing ones would be improved and a new one built in Asia to help alert the force of interceptor missiles of enemy attack.
- High-resolution radars. These can better resolve targets in space to aid tracking, eliminate decoys and assess whether targeted warheads have been destroyed. Nine would be built.
- Missile-tracking satellites. These detect heat from newly launched missiles and can help estimate flight paths. In time, existing ones would be supplemented by five new ones, all in high orbits.
- Warhead-tracking satellites. From low orbits, 24 of these new spacecraft would aid the hunt for warheads and decoys.
- Command centers. The main one at Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., a bunker hewn out of solid rock, would link all the data, and its officers would fight the defensive war.
- In-flight relays. On the ground, radio transmitters would send navigational signals to missile interceptors heading for battle.

The goal of this network is not only to aid kill vehicles but to push the defensive battle as close as possible to enemy territory so as to give military officers time to fire more than one interceptor at a specific warhead, raising the odds of success. The tactic is known as shoot-look-shoot. In theory, antimissile officials say, three or more hits might be attempted against a given warhead.

General Kadish, director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, told Congress in February that if interceptors are 80 percent dependable, two tries will provide 96 percent confidence and three will give 99 percent assurance of a successful kill.

The anticipated power of the weapon system is a state secret. But documents that the State Department gave Moscow in January said the full system would be able to destroy up to 50 enemy warheads.

From:

- Union of Concerned Scientists Fact Sheet
- A Missile Defense With Limits: The ABC's of the Clinton Plan
By William J. Broad. New York Times, 30 June 2000



Appendix 2: Theatre Missile Defence

The United States is developing several theater missile defense (TMD) systems, which are intended to defend against shorter-range missiles than the national missile defense (NMD) system is. While NMD is designed to defend the entire United States, these theater systems are intended to defend smaller areas. They are designed to be mobile so that they can be deployed with troops or moved as needed to defend US allies. (See Table 2.) Theater missile defenses fall into three categories: "lower-tier" (or "low-altitude") defenses, "upper-tier" (or "high-altitude") defenses, and "boost-phase" defenses.

Lower-Tier Defenses

As their name implies, lower-tier defenses are designed to intercept missiles low in the atmosphere (at altitudes less than approximately 20 kilometers). The interceptors must intercept their targets in the atmosphere because they maneuver to their target by using fins to steer through the air (in the same way that a sailor steers a boat through water by using a rudder). Lower-tier defenses have relatively slow-flying interceptors that cannot fly very far before intercepting their targets; therefore, lower-tier defenses can cover only relatively small areas. Lower-tier defenses are designed to intercept short-range ballistic missiles, with ranges of up to roughly 600 to 1,500 kilometers, depending on the system. In addition, these defenses are designed to shoot down aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States has one lower-tier theater defense in operation: Patriot PAC-2, a transportable, truck-mounted system designed to defend small areas against aircraft and ballistic missiles with ranges of up to about 600 kilometers. The interceptor uses a "blast fragmentation" warhead that is designed to explode once it gets within several meters of its target. The current version is an upgraded version of the Patriot Pac-2 defense that was used against Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War but failed to destroy all but a few, if any, Scud warheads.

Lower-tier defenses currently under development by the United States are: Patriot PAC-3, a transportable, truck-mounted system designed to defend small areas against ballistic missiles with ranges up to about 1,500 kilometers. Unlike the PAC-2, this system does not use an explosive warhead. Rather, PAC-3 uses a "hit-to-kill" interceptor (based on the earlier Erint missile), which is designed to destroy its target by hitting it directly.

Navy Area Defense, a ship-based system designed to defend small areas against aircraft, and ballistic missiles with ranges up to 600-1,000 kilometers. Like Patriot Pac-2, this system will use an explosive warhead.

Medium-range Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a truck-mounted system designed to be more mobile than the Patriot systems and to be deployed with ground troops as they move in the field. By contrast, Patriot is designed to be operated from a single location for days at a time or longer. MEADS uses a hit-to-kill warhead and is designed to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to perhaps 1,500 kilometers. MEADS is an international program under joint development with Germany and Italy.

Upper-Tier Defenses

Upper-tier defenses are designed to intercept missiles high in the atmosphere or above the atmosphere. This permits large ground areas to be covered. At the same time,



upper-tier defenses are designed to intercept longer-range theater missiles, with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers. Upper-tier defenses are also intended to be used as the first layer of a layered defense against short-range missiles, with the lower-tier theater defenses providing the second layer of defense.

The United States has two upper-tier defenses under development. Both use hit-to-kill interceptors that maneuver to their target by using small thrusters to change their trajectory. (These interceptors operate at high altitudes where there is not enough air to enable them to maneuver by using fins.) The interceptors use infrared sensors to detect the target and home on it. Such sensors, which detect heat, will be blinded if they are used at low altitudes where the air resistance causes heating of the fast-flying sensor. Thus, upper-tier interceptors have a minimum intercept altitude below which they cannot intercept a target. Because they are designed to intercept their targets high in or outside the atmosphere, these defenses--like the national missile defense system--are vulnerable to countermeasures that use lightweight decoys.

The two systems are:

- THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense), a land-based system intended to defend large areas against missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers. THAAD is designed to be transportable by aircraft. It is designed to intercept missiles high in the atmosphere (at altitudes above about 40 kilometers) or above the atmosphere. The THAAD interceptor has a top speed of about 2.5 kilometers per second.
- Navy Theater-Wide, a ship-based system intended to defend large areas against missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers. Navy Theater-Wide is designed to intercept only above the atmosphere; it will use the LEAP (lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile) kinetic kill vehicle, which cannot intercept at altitudes below about 80-100 kilometers. Thus, the system could not intercept short-range missiles with a range less than about 300-400 kilometers, since they never reach an altitude of 80-100 kilometers. Navy Theater Wide is intended to intercept targets in the middle of their trajectory (in mid-course) or--if the ship can position itself near the missile launch site--in the beginning of their trajectory shortly after the missile engine finishes burning (in ascent phase). The interceptor has a speed of about 4.5 kilometers per second. The system will be deployed on Aegis ships, which use the SPY radar system.

A second generation system--Navy Theater Wide Block II--is also planned for deployment after 2010. This system would use a faster interceptor and a more powerful radar.

Strategic Capability of Upper-Tier Defenses

Although upper-tier theater defenses are nominally designed to intercept theater missiles with ranges of up to only 3,500 kilometers, if such defenses can be made to work they will also have a capability against intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with range up to 10,000 kilometers.

In fact, a 1998 Pentagon study titled "Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense" (the unclassified summary of which was sent to Congress on August 10, 1999) concluded that integrating the planned Navy Theater Wide system into



the planned ground-based NMD system would result in a far superior system. Doing so would add some additional 600 Navy Theater Wide interceptors to the ground-based NMD system.

The dual-capability of upper-tier theater defenses is a consequence of the fact that these defenses are designed to intercept their targets high in or outside the atmosphere, where the probability of making an intercept depends on the closing speed of the interceptor and the target (in this case the missile warhead). While a theater ballistic missile with a range of 3,500 kilometers has a reentry speed of roughly 5 kilometers per second, a ballistic missile with a much longer range of 10,000 kilometers has only a slightly higher reentry speed of roughly 7 kilometers per second (which is 40% greater than 5 kilometers per second). (There is a direct relationship between the range of a ballistic missile and its speed at the end of its flight, when it reenters the atmosphere. The longer the range of the missile, the greater its speed upon reentry.) If two targets have reentry speeds that differ by 40%, their closing speeds relative to an interceptor will differ by less than 40%. Thus, unless the capability of an upper-tier theater defense is already marginal against theater missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometers (which the defense is designed to intercept), it will have an inherent capability against ICBMs. On the other hand, if such defenses are not capable of intercepting an ICBM, then they would have no or very limited capability against long-range theater ballistic missiles.

Because upper-tier defenses have an inherent capability against ICBMs, their development and deployment is restricted by the original 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In order to permit deployment of these systems to proceed legally, the United States sought to modify the treaty beginning in Fall 1993, and reached partial agreement with Russia in September 1997. Russia agreed to consider deployment of the US THAAD system legal under the treaty, but not the deployment of Navy Theater Wide. That issue remains unresolved .

However, the United States plans to go forward with deployment of Navy Theater Wide. The Pentagon argues that Navy Theater Wide would have no capability against strategic missiles, but this assertion is based on the limitations of the SPY radar that is carried on the Aegis cruisers on which Navy Theater-Wide would be deployed. If the interceptor is instead given information from more capable sensors, such as the ground-based radars that will be deployed as part of the NMD system or the SBIRS-low space-based missile tracking system, then there is little doubt that it would have strategic capability.

In fact, the SBIRS-low missile tracking system (described in the NMD section above) is intended for use with both NMD and TMD. In principle, this system could greatly increase the defended areas of upper-tier theater defenses, since their coverage is limited more by the system radars than the interceptors. In particular, it could allow an upper-tier theater defense--especially Navy Theater Wide--to become a wide-area, ICBM-capable system that could augment or serve as a national missile defense. These upper-tier systems would no longer be limited by the capabilities of their ground- or ship-based radars, which would otherwise be needed to track the missile targets and guide the interceptors near their targets. Not surprisingly, whether deployment of SBIRS-low is permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is under contention between Russia and the United States.



Boost-Phase Defenses

In addition to the defenses discussed above, which are designed to intercept their targets in the middle or at the end of the missile's flight, the United States is also developing systems to intercept missiles during the early, powered part of flight when the rocket booster is burning. This part of the missile's trajectory is called the "boost phase," and such ballistic missile defenses are termed "boost-phase defenses." The advantage of boost phase defenses is that they are designed to destroy the missile before the warhead and any decoys are released, so there would be only one target to destroy rather than potentially dozens or hundreds. A boost phase defense would also be able to destroy submunitions before they were released. Deploying chemical or biological weapons on numerous submunitions would be the best way for an attacker to distribute the agents, and would simply overwhelm any mid-course and terminal defense system. The disadvantage of boost-phase defenses is that the boost phase lasts for only a few minutes, and the interceptor must be able to make its intercept close to the launch site.

The United States has one boost-phase theater defense under development:

Airborne Laser (ABL), designed to attack short- and medium-range missiles during their boost phase with a laser based on a modified Boeing 747 airplane. The laser would be targeted on the missile, and if it shined on the same spot for long enough, it would weaken the metal surface by heating it to its structural-failure temperature--where the strength of the metal falls dramatically. For theater missiles, the airplane must be within several hundred kilometers of the missile the laser is attacking. It is generally assumed that the airplane would need to fly outside the borders of a country to avoid being shot down by air defenses; thus, this system is presumed to be incapable of attacking missiles launched from relatively large countries. The exception would be in a conflict in which the United States had already established air superiority. In principle, the airborne laser would also be capable of causing a long-range missile to fail but Russian and Chinese land-based missiles are not assumed to be vulnerable to the ABL since they are based far inland. However, the airborne laser could in principle threaten Russia's long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

From: Union of Concerned Scientists Fact Sheet



Appendix 4: Pine Gap

Pine Gap, officially known as the Joint Defence Space Research Facility, is one of the largest and most important US satellite ground control stations in the world.

Established in 1968 as a CIA intelligence base and situated in Central Australia, 19 km south-west of Alice Springs, it consists of a large computer complex with eight radomes protecting its antennae from the elements and satellite reconnaissance.

In the 1960s, there was much technical expansion of electronic communications in space. Satellites equipped with powerful receivers were strategically positioned to eavesdrop on selected communications. The satellites act as giant microphones which can accurately pick up even minor transmissions and rebroadcast them to receiving stations (such as Pine Gap) on earth, which then process or redirect the signals.

The first generation of satellites, launched in 1970 the year Pine Gap became operational, were designed to spy on Soviet missile developments and for general espionage in Asia. They were used during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, in Vietnam, and later to spy on China.

A second generation was launched in the mid-1970s, especially designed for communications surveillance -- for example, conversations and radio communications between Soviet military commanders.

The development of third generation satellites, launched in 1978, was stepped-up after the 1979 fall of the Shah forced the closure of US eavesdropping bases in Iran.

A fourth generation, Magnum, was launched on the space shuttle Discovery in January 1985. These were huge receivers designed to pick up information on Soviet missile tests, and military and diplomatic communications. From 1983, Pine Gap was expanded to receive the increased volume of signals from these satellites.

Pine Gap's most important role is processing information gathered by Rhyolite signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites and transmitting that information to the United States. These satellites act as 'vacuum cleaners', sucking up radio transmissions across a wide spectrum. Military intelligence is obtained, along with economic, political and domestic information from national and international telephone and radio communications between allies and enemies alike.

Pine Gap's satellites gather military radio transmissions, giving information on military readiness, troop and ship movements and other matters. The satellites can intercept radar emanations, allowing mapping of air defences, anti-ballistic missile radars and early-warning radars.

During the Gulf War, Pine Gap intercepted electronic and radio signals from the Iraqi forces, providing vital intelligence for US Army commanders in the Gulf. The base played a significant role in providing information on Iraqi air and ground defences, troop deployments and military infrastructure - the information supplied through Pine Gap helped to make possible the final American assault on Iraqi forces.

Warheads released by ballistic missiles during test flights emit telemetry (radio signals) which provide Pine Gap with information on missile performance. The technical



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characteristics of the missile can be determined to verify the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreements.

It is often argued that the bases are needed in the post-Cold War period for arms control verification - even though NMD will destroy the existing arms control regime. However, Pine Gap's arms treaty verification role is estimated to be as little as 0.3% of its activity.

Nurrungar

The US facility at Nurrungar, 500 km north-west of Adelaide, was established in 1971 as a US military communications base.

Its main role was to monitor nuclear explosions and missile launch activity and convey the information to the US. It was the main overseas station for the US Defence Support Program (DSP). These functions have now been transferred to Pine Gap.

Nurrungar received data from Defence Support Program (DSP) satellites which monitor missile launches and nuclear explosions and relayed this information to the United States.

The Defense Support Program is a vital element in the US military's worldwide network. DSP consists of satellites and two main ground stations: one in Colorado (USA) and the other at Nurrungar.

The DSP satellites have infrared sensors which detect the hot exhaust plumes of missiles in their boost phase just after launching. Thus the satellites can provide early warning of a missile attack and also pinpoint the location of the launch sites.

Information on where, when and how many missiles are launched is vital to any war-fighting strategy. DSP satellites also carry NUDET (NUclear explosion DETection) sensors which can detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and provide information on their location and density.

Nurrungar was the command and control station for DSP-East - the satellites located over the Indian Ocean to detect missile launches and nuclear explosions in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the states of the former Soviet Union and Asia.

Between June 1989 and February 1991, the US launched three of a new generation of DSP satellites known as DSP-14. Equipped with advanced NUDET sensors and 4,000 more infrared sensors, the new satellites allow better discrimination between missiles of different countries and can provide instant warning of their launch and location.

The ALP has said that in Government it will "very carefully review the issue of possible Australian involvement in the NMD program through the role of the Satellite Relay Ground Station".

This is the same as saying it is prepared to support NMD since the Satellite Relay Ground Station at Pine Gap replaces the US base at Nurrungar and controls the US Defence Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites.



Appendix 5: The Target is China

When Pentagon officials first sat down last year to update the core planning document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they listed China as a potential future adversary, a momentous change from the last decade of the Cold War.

But when the final version of the document, titled "Joint Vision 2020," is released next week, it will be far more discreet. Rather than explicitly pointing at China, it simply will warn of the possible rise of an unidentified "peer competitor."

The Joint Chiefs' wrestling with how to think about China -- and how open to be about that effort--captures in a nutshell the U.S. military's quiet shift away from its traditional focus on Europe. Cautiously but steadily, the Pentagon is looking at Asia as the most likely arena for future military conflict, or at least competition.

This new orientation is reflected in many small but significant changes: more attack submarines assigned to the Pacific, more war games and strategic studies centered on Asia, more diplomacy aimed at reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in the area.

It is a trend that carries huge implications for the shape of the armed services. It also carries huge stakes for U.S. foreign policy. Some specialists warn that as the United States thinks about a rising China, it ought to remember the mistakes Britain made in dealing with Germany in the years before World War I.

The new U.S. military interest in Asia also reverses a Cold War trend under which the Pentagon once planned by the year 2000 to have just "a minimal military presence" in Japan, recalls retired Army Gen. Robert W. RisCassi, a former U.S. commander in South Korea.

Two possibilities are driving this new focus. The first is a chance of peace in Korea; the second is the risk of a hostile relationship with China.

Although much of the current discussion in Washington is about a possible military threat from North Korea, for military planners the real question lies further ahead: What to do after a Korean rapprochement? In this view, South Korea already has won its economic and ideological struggle with North Korea, and all that really remains is to negotiate terms for peace.

According to one Defense Department official, William S. Cohen's first question to policy officials when he became defense secretary in 1997 was: How can we change the assumption that U.S. troops will be withdrawn after peace comes to the Korean peninsula? Next month's first-ever summit between the leaders of North and South Korea puts a sharper edge on this issue.

In the longer run, many American policymakers expect China to emerge sooner or later as a great power with significant influence over the rest of Asia. That, along with a spate of belligerent statements about Taiwan from Chinese officials this spring, has helped focus the attention of top policymakers on China's possible military ambitions.

The Buzzword Is China

Between tensions over Taiwan and this week's House vote to normalize trade relations with China, "China is the new Beltway buzzword," observed Dov S. Zakheim, a former



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Pentagon official who is an adviser on defense policy to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush.

To be sure, large parts of the U.S. military remain "Eurocentric," especially much of the Army. The shift is being felt most among policymakers and military planners--that is, officials charged with thinking about the future--and least among front-line units. Nor is it a change that the Pentagon is proclaiming from the rooftops. Defense Department officials see little value in being explicit about the shift in U.S. attention, which could worry old allies in Europe and antagonize China.

Even so, military experts point to changes on a variety of fronts. For example, over the last several years, there has been an unannounced shift in the Navy's deployment of attack submarines, which in the post-Cold War world have been used as intelligence assets--to intercept communications, monitor ship movements and clandestinely insert commandos--and also as front-line platforms for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles against Iraq, Serbia and other targets. Just a few years ago, the Navy kept 60 percent of its attack boats in the Atlantic. Now, says a senior Navy submariner, it has shifted to a 50-50 split between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, and before long the Pacific may get the majority.

But so far the focus on Asia is mostly conceptual, not physical. It is now a common assumption among national security thinkers that the area from Baghdad to Tokyo will be the main location of U.S. military competition for the next several decades. "The focus of great power competition is likely to shift from Europe to Asia," said Andrew Krepinevich, director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a small but influential Washington think tank. James Bodner, the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, added that, "The center of gravity of the world economy has shifted to Asia, and U.S. interests flow with that."

War Gaming

The U.S. military's favorite way of testing its assumptions and ideas is to run a war game. Increasingly, the major games played by the Pentagon - except for the Army -- take place in Asia, on an arc from Tehran to Tokyo. The games are used to ask how the U.S. military might respond to some of the biggest questions it faces: Will Iran go nuclear -- or become more aggressive with an array of hard-to-stop cruise missiles? Will Pakistan and India engage in nuclear war--or, perhaps even worse, will Pakistan break up, with its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Afghan mujaheddin? Will Indonesia fall apart? Will North Korea collapse peacefully? And what may be the biggest question of all: Will the United States and China avoid military confrontation? All in all, estimates one Pentagon official, about two-thirds of the forward-looking games staged by the Pentagon over the last eight years have taken place partly or wholly in Asia.

Last year, the Air Force's biggest annual war game looked at the Mideast and Korea. This summer's game, "Global Engagement 5," to be played over more than a week at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, will posit "a rising large East Asian nation" that is attempting to wrest control of Siberia, with all its oil and other natural resources, from a weak Russia. At one point, the United States winds up basing warplanes in Siberia to defend Russian interests.



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Because of the sensitivity of talking about fighting China, "What everybody's trying to do is come up with games that are kind of China, but not China by name," said an Air Force strategist.

"I think that, however reluctantly, we are beginning to face up to the fact that we are likely over the next few years to be engaged in an ongoing military competition with China," noted Princeton political scientist Aaron L. Friedberg. "Indeed, in certain respects, we already are."

Twin Efforts

The new attention to Asia also is reflected in two long-running, military-diplomatic efforts.

The first is a drive to renegotiate the U.S. military presence in northeast Asia. This is aimed mainly at ensuring that American forces still will be welcome in South Korea and Japan if the North Korean threat disappears. To that end, the U.S. military will be instructed to act less like post-World War II occupation forces and more like guests or partners.

Pentagon experts on Japan and Korea say they expect that "status of forces agreements" gradually will be diluted, so that local authorities will gain more jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in criminal cases. In addition, they predict that U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea will be jointly operated in the future by American and local forces, perhaps even with a local officer in command.

At Kadena Air Force Base on the southern Japanese island of Okinawa, for example, the U.S. military has started a program, called "Base Without Fences," under which the governor has been invited to speak on the post, local residents are taken on bus tours of the base that include a stop at a memorial to Japan's World War II military, and local reporters have been given far more access to U.S. military officials.

Behind all this lies a quiet recognition that Japan may no longer unquestioningly follow the U.S. lead in the region. A recent classified national intelligence estimate concluded that Japan has several strategic options available, among them seeking a separate accommodation with China, Pentagon officials disclosed.

In the long term, this official added, a key goal of U.S. politico-military policy is to ensure that when Japan reemerges as a great power, it behaves itself in Asia, unlike the last time around, in the 1930s, when it launched a campaign of vicious military conquest.

Southeast Asia Redux

The second major diplomatic move is the negotiation of the U.S. military's reentry in Southeast Asia, 25 years after the end of the Vietnam War and almost 10 years after the United States withdrew from its bases in the Philippines. After settling on a Visiting Forces Agreement last year, the United States and the Philippines recently staged their first joint military exercise in years, "Balikatan 2000."

The revamped U.S. military relationship with the Philippines, argues one general, may be a model for the region. Instead of building "Little America" bases with bowling alleys and Burger Kings that are off-limits to the locals, U.S. forces will conduct frequent joint



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exercises to train Americans and Filipinos to operate together in everything from disaster relief to full-scale combat. The key, he said, isn't permanent bases but occasional access to facilities and the ability to work with local troops.

Likewise, the United States has broadened its military contacts with Australia, putting 10,000 troops into the Queensland region a year ago for joint exercises. And this year, for the first time, Singapore's military is participating in "Cobra Gold," the annual U.S.-Thai exercise. Singapore also is building a new pier specifically to meet the docking requirements of a nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier. The U.S. military even has dipped a cautious toe back into Vietnam, with Cohen this spring becoming the first defense secretary since Melvin R. Laird to visit that nation.

Where the Generals Are

If the U.S. military firmly concludes that its major missions are likely to take place in Asia, it may have to overhaul the way it is organized, equipped and even led. "Most U.S. military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital U.S. interests," said "Asia 2025," a Pentagon study conducted last summer. "The threats are in Asia," it warned.

This study, recently read by Cohen, pointedly noted that U.S. military planning remains "heavily focused on Europe," that there are four times as many generals and admirals assigned to Europe as to Asia, and that about 85 percent of military officers studying foreign languages are still learning European tongues.

"Since I've been here, we've tried to put more emphasis on our position in the Pacific," Cohen said in an interview as he flew home from his most recent trip to Asia. This isn't, he added, "a zero-sum game, to ignore Europe, but recognizing that the [economic] potential in Asia is enormous"--especially, he said, if the United States is willing to help maintain stability in the region.

In a few years, Pentagon insiders predict, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be from the Navy or Air Force, following 12 years in which Army officers have been the top officers in the military. Perhaps even more significantly, they foresee the Air Force taking away from the Navy at least temporarily the position of "CINCPAC," the commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific. There already is talk within the Air Force of basing parts of an "Air Expeditionary Force" in Guam, where B-2 stealth bombers have been sent in the past in response to tensions with North Korea.

Some analysts believe that the hidden agenda of the U.S. military is to use the rise of Asia as a way to shore up the Pentagon budget, which now consumes about 3 percent of the gross domestic product, compared to 5.6 percent at the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Indeed, Cohen is already making the point that operating in Asia is expensive. He said it is clear that America will have to maintain "forward" forces in Asia. And that, he argued, will require a bigger defense budget.

"There's a price to pay for what we're doing," Cohen concluded. "The question we're going to have to face in the coming years is, are we willing to pay up?"

From: For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront
by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post May 26 2000



Appendix 6: Blue Paper Project Comments on Defence Review 2000

The Blue Paper Project is an initiative of over 40 non-government organisations to generate discussion of the political and military role Australia will play in the 21st Century, and of the defence philosophy and policies adopted by government. It was founded in 1993.

The Federal Government's commitment to community consultation with the release of its discussion paper Defence Review 2000 is welcome. Democratisation of the defence debate may produce a better and more appropriate result than in the past.

However, before discussing competing claims for military spending, we need to examine the complex nature of security and the interconnections between its various dimensions and to re-examine our security priorities. Security is becoming more multi-dimensional and it is bad policy to continue to look at defence in isolation. It is time to assess the best way to balance and integrate our responses.

Security is often interpreted to mean military security -- the capacity to identify and meet perceived threats to a nation by military means, by the use or the threat of the use of force. Australia's security will be enhanced by attention to social, political and humanitarian issues which affect the people of this country as well as in neighbouring states.

The over-emphasis in casting the military as Australia's guarantee of "security" has not engendered a true culture of national security. Resources committed to developing the military have meant that less is available for constructive work such as preventive diplomacy.

In addition, more money spent on the military means less money for developing strong social cohesion and stability within the nation through employment programs and the health, education and housing needs of Australians and our neighbours.

The most obvious economic feature of military expenditure is its "opportunity costs", that is, the opportunities which are foregone for alternative consumption and investment.

The World Bank has reported that "evidence increasingly points to high military spending as contributing to fiscal and debt crises, complicating stabilisation and adjustment, and negatively affecting economic growth and development".

Since military expenditure tends to reduce public and private investment, divert funds and personnel from civilian research and development and to increase the current account deficit, it tends to retard the rate of economic growth.

While Australia's defence is important, the cost to our economy, environment and political rights cannot be too high or we will have little or nothing left worth protecting.

There is no readily identifiable threat to Australia of major direct attack. This has been so for decades and there is no evidence it will change in the foreseeable future. The regional strategic environment is clearly complex and changing, but this does not necessarily mean it is more dangerous for Australia.



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Conflicts in the region are predominantly internal. They are not directed against Australia and they cannot be solved by military means.

Australia does face threats from refugees, drug smuggling and international terrorism, but a military response is ineffective in such circumstances.

Regional engagement requires that we rethink what we mean by security, develop different relationships with regional states and increase aid to our neighbours.

One of the uses of overseas aid is to assist recipient to cope better with their conflict-inducing social and economic problems.

Overseas aid is a cost effective means of contributing to reducing the problems of people in our region, yet our contribution is minute compared to defence spending.

We cannot afford a continued cold war paradigm which defines regional engagement as interoperability with the United States in potential high intensity conflicts.

This would require expanding strategic strike and force projection capabilities, maintaining a 'knowledge edge' over regional states and remaining a substantial maritime power. Australia simply cannot afford such an approach economically, politically and socially.

A rational reassessment of our security priorities would lead to a number of conclusions which may be at odds with the Federal Government's stated intention of increasing defence spending.

These could include such things as using more defensive and less costly systems as opposed to the long-range, aggressive capabilities currently in use; developing a proper coastal protection system; committing Australia to possess enough military force to defend our territory but not to threaten the territory of other states; purchasing more dual-use equipment (for example, aircraft which can be used for water bombing bushfires as well as for coastal surveillance and interception); investing time and effort in regional arms control through bodies such as ASEAN; increasing the share of GDP allocated to overseas aid; contributing to the elimination of the foreign debt problem; and expanding trade, co-operation in the development of science and medicine, educational and cultural exchanges.

We have the opportunity to take advantage of regional and global changes, to develop a process of disarmament, dedicated peace-making, confidence building and conflict resolution.

The government's goal must be to minimise military expenditure as far as responsible defence strategy allows. More arms make Australia poorer, not safer.