History, health and human security in West Papua

A paper prepared for MAPW by James Breheny, student of International Relations, La Trobe University, August 2011
This paper investigates how externally imposed political, militaristic, socio-economic and environmental factors have shaped health and human security in Indonesia's Papuan provinces, with a particular focus on the health of indigenous Papuans.

Health and human security are defined broadly, following current United Nations’ definitions:

'Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity'(WHO).\(^1\)

'In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety'(UNDP).\(^2\)

The health of an individual or group is not static or determined only by single factors but influenced a whole range of contributing societal elements that evolve over time. A human can be defined as 'healthy' in terms of dietary intake or lack of disease; but other social and societal factors such as poverty, inequality or political marginalisation may also contribute to their longer term healthiness. Thus current deficits in health and well-being can reflect past and ongoing distributions of privilege, power and wealth within societies.

This paper charts the history of West Papua which has determined the declining health and human security of its indigenous population, resulting in deficits of well being, equality and physical health.

It documents many areas where health indicators are significantly poorer than in other parts of Indonesia. These range from malnutrition, to the degree of child mortality, to other indicators such HIV infection rates.

Structure of this paper
- **1. Historic and economic background** and its effect on West Papua’s human security.
- **2. Social and economic factors** determining health in West Papua.
- **3. Physical health consequences** and realities.

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Historic and economic background and its effect on West Papua’s human security.

The western half of the island of New Guinea has undergone several name changes, especially since Indonesia’s political control was extended in the 1960s. The west of the island now includes two Indonesian provinces, but to avoid confusion this paper will treat the territory as one entity and simply refer to it as West Papua unless specific distinction is required and indicated.

Early West Papuan society
For centuries external actors have played a central and often detrimental role within the lives and societies of the indigenous inhabitants of West Papua. While the cultural boundaries of Melanesia extend into Indonesia’s eastern provinces, such as Maluku, the Melanesian population of West Papua is ethnically and culturally different from most of its Indonesian neighbours, and shares closer societal and cultural links with fellow Melanesians from Papua New Guinea (PNG). Within the island there is great diversity, illustrated by the fact that in 1963 over 200 separate languages and dialects were recorded in this western province alone. Historically, the population was organised into independent groups, where marriage customs and the availability of food and resources dictated that typical community sizes ranged from fifty to a maximum of a few hundred members.

Trade relations and foreign sovereignty
Papuan societies have had recorded contact with outsiders as far back as the seventh century, when South Sumatra, Malay and Chinese sea merchants initiated trade relations which sometimes included violent slave raiding. Indonesia’s sovereign claims over the territory stem from these early Sumatran trade relations. When the Dutch arrived in 1660, they recognised the Sultan of Tidore’s (Moluccas) overarching sovereignty, and by 1797 this eventually became the basis of their own sovereign claim, when the Molucca’s Sultan became a proxy Papuan ruler for Holland. By 1827 the Dutch had staked their national flag on a West Papuan beach. In 1848 Dutch ownership stretched to the island’s 141st meridian and was formalized with Britain and Germany, who had divided and claimed the two eastern territories of Papua (under British administration) and New Guinea (a German colony till WW1), which today make up the independent state of Papua New Guinea (PNG).

Dutch colonisation
As the colonial influence of the Dutch in West Papua grew, numerous settlements, missions and administration outposts were established, but these remained predominantly along the coast line. This caused some traditional West Papuan societal structures to gradually change, as a monetary system began to supplement barter and trade, and a judicial and parliamentary system was established to protect Dutch interests and reinforce
colonial control. Operating this colonial system increasingly required the participation of West Papuan locals, which correspondingly caused indigenous education and skills levels to increase and the formation of Papuan elites, who began rallying for independence and national autonomy.

Indonesia’s independence and West Papua’s desire for self-determination
Following the upheaval of WW2, Indonesia gained independence in 1949 under the nationalist party of President Sukarno, preventing the Dutch from resuming their previous colonial position within the region. In a measure to save face, Holland did however manage to separate West Papua from the handover of greater Indonesia, which remained under Dutch rule pending further deliberations. The West Papuan population had little interest in joining the Indonesian nation, and this longing and demand for self determination was eventually furthered by the reluctant and ultimately self-interested support of the Dutch. A small but vocal indigenous pro-independence movement gained momentum, which culminated on 1st December 1961 with the adoption of a national anthem and flag, but significantly not a declaration of independence.

Debate over the future of West Papua continued for the next eight years.

Sovereignty disputes and Indonesian takeover
Prolonged negotiations in the United Nations resulted in a stalemate, causing Indonesia to coercively seize all Dutch commercial assets within the province and expel 50,000 Dutch nationals. The backdrop of the Cold War saw America enter discussions triggered by Sukarno’s growing relations with the USSR, and after an agreement was reached in New York in 1962 and ratified by the UN General Assembly, administration was transferred to a UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). This accord transferred administration and control to Indonesia in 1963, until the decision of integration or independence could be finalised via a UN sanctioned plebiscite six years later. The 1500 Indonesian commandos used for expelling the Dutch remained stationed within the province, and were soon participating in law and order ‘activities’ that unofficially included repressing West Papuan nationalism, and pacifying local populations through mass arrests, violence and murder.

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12 Drooglever, p. 53.
14 Rifai-Hasan, p. 131.
16 MacLeod, p. 2.

18 King, p. 21.
19 Osborne, p. 30.
20 Osborne, p. 30.
Indonesian occupation; coercive control increases

This Indonesian military occupation led to the creation in 1964 of the armed OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement), which undertook its first violent battle in 1965 near the village of Manokwari. Other conflicts soon followed and the ill-equipped OPM along with other indigenous resistance groups were quickly outnumbered and outgunned by huge influxes of Indonesian defence forces (Tentera Nasional Indonesia or TNI). The TNI targeted the civilian population along with armed factions in its attempts at crushing all forms of indigenous resistance. According to Saltford, many human rights abuses occurred during this time period including the aerial bombardment of villages, indiscriminate sprays of machine gun fire from helicopters and widespread torture and executions. Arguably, Indonesia’s increasing control over the provinces vast deposits of natural resources allowed it to foster international apathy over its brutal West Papuan policies, in effect trading economic partnerships for political capital, and selling ‘West Papua to multinational interests with the aim of gaining tacit support for its occupation’.

Freeport and business as a political lubricant

Following the 1965 military coup that eventually brought Suharto and his ‘New Order’ regime to power, negotiations began between American mining giant Freeport-McMoRan and Indonesian officials. The proposed investment by the US mining conglomerate was not only the first major foreign project in West Papua, but also the first significant foreign investment in New Order Indonesia at a time when there were widespread international concern over the massacre of up to one million people. By 1967 and two years before Indonesian sovereignty had been decided, Freeport signed its first contract permitting geological exploration and mining at West Papua’s Mount Ertseberg. Suharto hoped this contract could lubricate greater bilateral relations between Indonesia and America, and assist in attracting other international investment, foreign aid, technical expertise and development projects.

Freeport and its American board members became this economic and political conduit and a de facto Indonesian lobby group, representing the Suharto government’s business credentials, political legitimacy and stability as a prosperous new business partner. Due to Indonesia’s lack of sovereignty over West Papua the legal basis of this contract was vague, but it seemed to imply a degree of legitimacy to Indonesia’s claim over this province.

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23 Brundige et al., p. 14.
24 Brundige et al., p. 14.
31 Whittaker, p. 44.
Flawed democracy and the ‘Act of Free Choice’

Under the auspices of the UN, the 1969 'Act of Free Choice' plebiscite became a farcical illustration of predetermined Indonesian dictated 'democracy', where a mere 1,026 voters were chosen to represent a population of over 700,000. The selection of this symbolic 0.2% of the population was mostly completed independently by Indonesian officials, as UN observers only witnessed the selection of 195 of these individuals, some of whom they noted as being clearly coerced by the Indonesian military. When voting occurred, often at sites located within Indonesian police and military compounds, a unanimous vote was produced in favour of West Papua’s integration into greater Indonesia. The process of the Act of Free Choice was criticized by international observers and the UN General Assembly simply voted to ‘note’ rather than endorse the results of the referendum. However the decision was ultimately upheld, possibly aided by Suharto’s closer relationship with the US following his ruthless purge of Indonesian communists, and the nation’s new international economic ties.

Business concerns move into West Papua

Encouraged by the Indonesian government, multinational business interests began plundering West Papua’s natural resources from the 1970s onwards. This has included the rapid destruction of rainforests by Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean and Indonesian logging companies, and the propagation of plantations and agricultural businesses. Industrial fishing rights were also granted, with one of the largest awarded to a Japanese fleet of 40 ships. By 1987 a French fishing company named Transpeche had set up a fishing plant and cannery base on the island of Biak, with the capacity to catch and process 25,000 tonnes of fish per year. The capacity of indigenous groups to sustain themselves using traditional food gathering practices deteriorated with their environment’s gradual transformation. The Indonesian policy of transmigration in the 1960s to 1970s, which brought large numbers of small traders and farmers from overpopulated provinces like Sulawesi, compounded the threats to local populations caused by the Trans-National Corporations (TNCs), as they threatened the small business sector which was one of the few places where locals had any influence.

Oil and gas industries

These pressures on West Papua’s native ecological system and indigenous population were heightened by the expanding extraction of its valuable geological reserves. Oil exploration and drilling began again in the Sorong district on oil fields previously utilized by Dutch and American companies in the 1950s, but this time exploited by South African company Petromer Trend in conjunction with Indonesian state oil company Pertamina. Between 1972 and 1982 this

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33 MacLeod, p. 2; Brundige et al., p. 18.
34 Broek, p. 2.
36 Whittaker, p. 73.
37 Whittaker, p. 74.
38 Whittaker, p. 75.
40 Whittaker, p. 73.
joint enterprise produced 130,000 barrels per day until supply dwindled in 1988 to 26,000 barrels per day.\textsuperscript{41} Other oil drilling occurred during the early 1980s in areas in the south of Sorong by joint American/Indonesian company Conoco-Pertamina.\textsuperscript{42} More recently (beginning in 2006) a liquefied gas processing and exportation plant has been set up in Bintuni Bay directed by its large share holder British Petroleum (BP), which operates on the Tangguh gas fields.\textsuperscript{43} To varying extents these operations have compounded the marginalisation and powerlessness of indigenous groups, as external corporate ownership and its prioritisation of profits merge with the political and economic objectives of Jakarta, often overshadowing indigenous wellbeing and rights.\textsuperscript{44} The history of West Papua’s lucrative mining industry is an illustration of this.

**Freeport**

When Freeport became the first major foreign investor in the country it was rewarded with an idyllic 30 year contract over 250,000 metric acres at Ertsberg, including tax holidays, lax environmental regulations and implied protection by the Indonesian military.\textsuperscript{45} Indigenous groups were not consulted and Freeport had ‘broad powers over the local population and resources, including the right to take land and other property and to resettle indigenous inhabitants while providing “reasonable compensation” only for dwellings and other permanent structures’.\textsuperscript{46} By 1988-89 Freeport’s political influence grew when it became the largest single tax payer to the nation.\textsuperscript{47} When Ertsberg’s gold, silver and copper reserves faded, Freeport’s focus shifted to nearby Grasberg which became the largest known gold deposit in the world.\textsuperscript{48} Between 1991 and 1994 two new contracts were signed which increased state ownership through subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia to 9.36%, and granted exploration and mining over 50 years to approximately nine million acres of mountainous highlands.\textsuperscript{49} With the mine generating US$33 billion in direct and indirect benefits for the Indonesian state between 1992 and 2004, Indonesia’s customary land rights were effectively buried under the greater national interest.\textsuperscript{50} While recent mining revenue redistributions have been made, local indigenous populations still suffer from the ‘loss of food gardens, hunting grounds, fishing areas and drinking water’.\textsuperscript{51}

**The natural resource industry and environmental destruction**

The environmental impact of the natural resource industry in West Papua has been profound. An example of this occurred in 1983 when oil drilling decimated 600,000 trees on indigenous land in the Inanwatan district.\textsuperscript{52} Official logging concessions now cover 30% of West Papua’s territory and are estimated to have increased tenfold between the years of 1986 to 1996.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Budiardjo & Liong, p. 73.
\item Budiardjo & Liong, p. 74.
\item Stott, p. 25.
\item Leith, 2002, p. 72.
\item Leith, 2002, p. 76.
\item Leith, 2002, p. 75, 83.
\item Leith, 2002, p. 87; Stott, p. 15.
\item Leith, 2002, p. 88.
\item Martinkus, p. 44.
\item Whittaker, p. 74.
\item Stott, p. 18.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
destruction of rainforest has coupled with the recent desire of the Indonesian government to escalate profitable but destructive mono-cropping practices, illustrated in 2007 when 'the Forestry Ministry identified around 9 million acres of forest across West Papua for possible conversion to palm oil plantations'.\footnote{Stott, p. 19.} Mine tailings constitute the greatest environmental problem from the mining industry, irreversibly altering the ecology of surrounding forests and rivers, and killing fauna and flora.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 132.} According to Leith, Ertsberg used local rivers as waste gutters for the 250,000 tons of tailings it created daily, while 500,000 tons of unprocessed waste rock were similarly dumped in neighbouring valleys.\footnote{Leith, 2003, p. 163.} Now in the place of Ertsberg's former mining site is a putrid lake 2km wide and 360 metres deep, filled with green copper-infused water.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 132.} The Grasberg mine also uses local rivers to dispose of 97% of its total processed ore, causing these rivers to swell with silt and surrounding wetlands and rainforests to perish from flooding.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 133.}

**Effect on indigenous human security and belated environmental reform**
The indigenous population's human security has been irrevocably altered by these imposed transformations to their native environment and food sources. The relocation and subjugation of populations such as the low-land Kamoro and high-land Amungme who traditionally inhabited the land now dominated by Freeport has directly limited their ability to harvest forest products, lay crops, hunt and fish.\footnote{AA Walton, 'Mining a sacred land, Human rights dialogue: Environmental rights', Carnegie Council, 2004, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue, viewed 17 May 2011.} Freeport has belatedly made steps to amend its impacts on the environment.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.} Beginning in 1994, it formed an Environmental Department with a starting budget of US$17 million. Levees have been constructed to address silt and river pollution from tailings.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.} In 1996, after pressures from its shareholders and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Freeport agreed to provide US$150 million for the Grasberg mine’s eventual clean up.\footnote{Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.} These measures after ecological destruction has already occurred are of limited consolation to indigenous groups.

**Freeport and indigenous resistance**
For many indigenous West Papuans and armed pro-independence groups, the Freeport mining complex and its relationship with the TNI came to represent another face of Indonesian colonialism. Correspondingly the mine and its operations became a focal point for OPM attacks and sabotage. In 1977, as widespread revolt occurred across the highlands triggered by Freeport’s appropriation of 10,000 hectares of hunting grounds, the OPM blew up the primary slurry pipe from the Ertsberg mine.\footnote{Global Witness, 'Paying for protection: The Freeport mine and the Indonesian security forces', 2005, http://resources.revenuewatch.org/en/official-document/paying-protection-freeport-mine-and-indonesian-security-forces, viewed 18 May 2011.} Private business concerns, the national interest and Indonesian military actions became indivisible when the military sought reprisals through air raids on villages allegedly through firing mortars and machine guns at the populace from within the mine complex’s...

\begin{itemize}
\item Stott, p. 19.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 132.
\item Leith, 2003, p. 163.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 132.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 133.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.
\item Rifai-Hasan, p. 135.
\end{itemize}
As the revolt against Indonesian rule and the regime’s business interests intensified, the TNI turned much of the territory into a battle ground, and perceiving the civilian population as indistinguishable from armed resistance groups, burnt hundreds of villages, killed thousands and forced many others to flee into PNG as refugees (especially in 1984-1986, when up to 12,000 crossed the border). 65

The TNI’s shadow economy

The escalation of conflict with indigenous groups has allowed the TNI to use its occupation and presence in West Papua to profit via extortion, bribery, rent seeking and security arrangements, both within and outside of legitimate mining, gas, and logging industries. 66 In a 2007 transcribed US embassy cable from Wikileaks, an Indonesian foreign affairs official reportedly claimed that ‘the Indonesian Military (TNI) has far more troops in Papua than it is willing to admit to, chiefly to protect and facilitate the TNI’s interests in illegal logging operations’. 67 A joint Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak report in 2005, found that 300,000 cubic metres of timber a month was being illegally logged and exported to China and India though companies run and supported by the TNI. 68 When discovered, the subsequent 2007 Indonesian government investigation found only 13 low level operators guilty from an initial list stretching to 186 suspects. 69 It is claimed that up to 70% of all illegal logged timber leaving Indonesia originates in West Papua. 70 As Stott ascertainst, this industry is lucrative for all levels of the military as ‘even the lowest ranks can earn money from it ... several forestry concessions are part-owned by military foundations ... [and] as with Freeport, military personal are frequently hired as security for both legal and illegal logging operations’. 71

Funding of the TNI by Freeport

A limited budget from Jakarta has meant the TNI has become a largely self-funded institution that depends on private business enterprises and independent payments from private actors such as Freeport to fund its operations within the area. 72 Freeport’s funding of the TNI began in the early 1970s when the mine opened. 73 Global Witness has claimed some payments were made directly to leading military and police personnel. These included a series of deposits into the account of Indonesian General Mahidin Simbolon in 1999 which reportedly totalled US$247,705. 74

64 Global Witness.
65 Whittaker, pp. 51-60.
According to Rifai-Hasan, total payments have been estimated at between US$18.5 to $35 million, and stopped in 2002 due to pressure from US domestic legal requirements. However, an investigation by Global Witness in 2005 found that PT Freeport Indonesia had paid US$10.3 million to the Indonesian military in 2002-03, justified as costs associated with 'infrastructure, food, travel, administration and community assistance programs'. The true extent and nature of all these TNI business arrangements are sketchy, but they arguably highlight a disturbing example of a national defence force acting autonomously for its own financial gain, and assuming the role of privately hired mercenaries to the detriment of indigenous populations.

The Indonesian military as a semi-autonomous institution
The unusual role and power of the military within Indonesia, and its influence in remote provinces like West Papua, stems from the active position the military assumed in the formation of the Indonesian nation, rather than the army being formed at a later stage. Under Suharto the police and military were combined, and this dynamic and semi-autonomous institution infiltrated 'all levels of Indonesian life - from a presence in the parliament, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and business, down to territorial divisions that had political representation in each and every village'. Its myth of dual power ('dwifungsi') located it as the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism, acting as kind of societal 'glue' which prevented civil war and ensured civic progression, while existing simultaneously within the nation’s political power structures. West Papua’s history of civic conflict, attempts at independence and the huge economic potential has meant the TNI’s role and influence in the territory has been, and continues to be profound. The centrality of this institution has diminished in Jakarta, but only slightly; and its presence and control in West Papua remains strong, as the 'TNI is an actor above, as well as heavily involved in politics and society, ... [remaining] essentially immune from the checks and balances of political and parliamentary give and take.'

The fall of Suharto’s New Order regime
The forced resignation and fall of Suharto in 1998 was prompted by financial crisis, the New Order’s inflexible patronage system, and widespread public dissatisfaction, which ultimately materialized in massive student led demonstrations. This eventually led to the launch of the 'reformasi' movement which sought to reform and strengthen democratic principles within Indonesian politics and state structures, and redefine the role of the military under civilian government. This removed many of the old military guard from the visible pillars of power, but the original dominance of this institution, its vast existing networks and fluid adaption into the new democratic era suggest that many of the characteristics and members of the old status quo remain covertly embedded within the Indonesian state. These sweeping governmental reforms within Jakarta, and the reduction of visible military influence in politics, saw West

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75 Rifai-Hasan, p. 137.
76 Global Witness.
78 Leith, 2003, p. 221.
80 King, 2004, p. 96.
82 Crouch, p. 1-16.
Papua’s indigenous population gain a degree of optimism for their future societal prospects. The Special Autonomy Law (below) initially personified this optimism and came as a result of the extended popular struggle in Jayapura in the period known as the ‘Papuan Spring’ from 1998 to November 2000, eventuating with creation of the Papua Presidium Council.  

The Papuan Spring

The Papuan Spring began in July 1998, when a coalition of NGO and church leaders, community figures, intellectuals and officials formed the FORERI (Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya, Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya), which developed a political program and reinterpreted the history of Papua’s integration into Indonesia. Papuan nationalist sentiment had grown in the vacuum created in the post-Suharto period. Now hoping to capitalize on the TNI’s waning political influence, ‘this Papuan elite rejected the armed struggle of the OPM and hoped, naively perhaps, to achieve independence through a dialogue with the Indonesian government and the international community.’

President Wahid supported autonomy for Papua at the beginning of his presidency, but this support fell victim to growing elite resistance in Jakarta to Wahid’s policies. Proposals from West Papuan intellectuals and officials for a new autonomy deal are currently under consideration in Jakarta, but may falter because of concern over ‘separatism’.

The Special Autonomy Law

The decentralising Special Autonomy Law was passed in 2001. It granted greater power to the Papuan People’s Council to control elements of their own indigenous welfare, including economic redistributions and limited self-governance. Viewed by some West Papuan intellectuals and leaders as a victorious turning point, other observers saw this law as simply a method to contain tensions over continued human rights abuses and inequality, and limit aspirations for true independence and nationhood. According to Stott, while the Papuan provincial authority has received greater control over natural resource revenue profits, not much of this has found its way to improving the lives and wealth of ordinary Papuans, and has largely been spent on an expanded civil service, depleted through corruption and wasted on ill-conceived projects. Its impact has also apparently been diminished by the fact ‘many central government ministries have been reluctant to cede power to the province’, and Jakarta has retained veto rights over all legislation. Jakarta has also kept control over West Papua’s monetary system, religious affairs, foreign policy, justice, defence and security.

Many indigenous groups have viewed this law as a failure and false hope, as the parameters of social justice and their human security are ultimately still defined by Indonesian policies, economic

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84 Chauvel, pp. 1-11.
85 Chauvel, pp. 1-11.
86 Chauvel, pp. 1-11.
87 Rees et al., p. 3.
89 Stott, p. 16.
90 Stott, p. 16.
patronages and its national police and armed forces. The presence and actions of the TNI and security forces in West Papua under the Special Autonomy Law still threaten indigenous well-being and political leadership. The 2001 assassination of elected Papuan Presidium Council leader Theys Hiyo Eluay could be conceptualized as an example of the threat the TNI poses to West Papua's new political conditions. In April 2004 an investigation into this death uncovered the involvement of 12 members of Kopassus (Indonesian special forces), and resulted in seven guilty verdicts and lenient murder sentences of between 2 and 3.5 years. Extraordinary killings still also occur, often under the pretext of the TNI’s battle with indigenous resistance groups, allowing it to shape the parameters of conflict to protect its own interests and revenue streams. In August 2002, a school bus was ambushed near the mining city of Timika, killing two Americans and one Indonesian while wounding another eleven people. This attack was blamed on rebels by police but Timmer's analysis suggests it was carried out by Kopassus soldiers, and related to disputes between Freeport and the military over pay increases and the theft of company property. West Papuan man Anthonius Wamang was indicted by an American court for the killing of US nationals, but disappeared from custody after claiming he was both a West Papuan rebel and a business associate of Indonesia soldiers. His whereabouts is still unknown.

**The TNI’s social manipulation and murder**

The original concept of dividing the province into three had surfaced years earlier, but was abandoned partly from indigenous resistance, stemming from concern this fragmenting would increase disunity and discord within the territory's Papuan community. Applying the Special Autonomy Law and its Papuan People's Council to two provinces instead of one diminished its concept of unified indigenous self-government and voided its original legal basis. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Home Affairs held elections for the new province’s governor, and after a 70% turnout of voters the division was complete. In November 2004 the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled that both the original Law motion no. 45/1999 and the Presidential instruction of 2003 had violated the constitution, but upheld the partition as the province had a legislature and elected members to the Indonesian House of Representatives.

**Division of province into two**

In January 2003 the Megawati government controversially began preparations for the division of the province into the two separate provincial entities of West Irian Jaya (West Papua) and Central Irian Jaya (Papua). The original concept of dividing the province into three had surfaced years earlier, but was abandoned partly from indigenous resistance, stemming from concern this fragmenting would increase disunity and discord within the territory's Papuan community. Applying the Special Autonomy Law and its Papuan People's Council to two provinces instead of one diminished its concept of unified indigenous self-government and voided its original legal basis. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Home Affairs held elections for the new province’s governor, and after a 70% turnout of voters the division was complete. In November 2004 the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled that both the original Law motion no. 45/1999 and the Presidential instruction of 2003 had violated the constitution, but upheld the partition as the province had a legislature and elected members to the Indonesian House of Representatives.
Motivations behind this division
MacLeod contends that 'the Indonesian government maintains its authority through a montage of confusing and contradictory policies that function to undermine political opposition by generating elite competition'. This allows Jakarta to exert influence and de facto rule by manipulating West Papuan leaders as they compete for power and position. The traditional autonomy of West Papuan communities before external settlements could also hamper political unity. Timmer outlines the formation at this time of 28 new regencies also provides greater individual distributions of revenues to those with larger deposits of natural resources within their districts. Although political advances have been made within the province they have not lived up to the original hopes and expectations of the West Papuan community, as a paradigm of 'divide and rule' still exists within this territory's power structures defined by Jakarta.

History as the foundation of modern indigenous well being and health
West Papua’s history of externally imposed political, economic and military forces has shaped the past and current insecurity of its indigenous population. This process has altered this population’s capacity to rely on its natural environment for survival, and its ability to minimise threats to its communal prosperity and personal safety. This national community without an independent state apparatus to protect its members and organize its own affairs and interests has become vulnerable to violence, disadvantage and the imposed prioritisation of external private and political interests. This paper now charts how the consequences of this reality have brought about a rapid decline in indigenous health, characterized by physical detriment, marginalisation, subjugation and descending cultural and socio-economic status. This historic progression and its modern repercussions have become the foundation for an unfolding health crisis.

Social and economic factors determining health in West Papua.

Violence and human rights abuses
A central and direct influence on the health and security of individuals or collectives is the freedom from (or imposition of) physical abuse or violence. Along with food, water and shelter, freedom from violence is fundamental for human survival and health. As previously mentioned, the Indonesian military, police and other security services have implemented human rights atrocities and violence across West Papua. Beginning before official Indonesian integration, this has affected and targeted the civilian population along with armed resistance groups. In 1981 Eliezer Bonay, Indonesia’s first governor of West Papua (who testified at a Port Moresby Tribunal on Human Rights), stated in a TAPOL interview that an estimated 30,000 West Papuans had been killed in the six years leading up to the ‘Act of Free Choice’. Another particularly horrific period of violence and murder stretched over the 1970s and into 1980s. With the closure of this territory to international journalists, health organisations and NGOs from 1963 onwards, much official documentation is lacking, and reports primarily come from

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103 MacLeod, p. 4.
104 Timmer, p. 411.
105 Brundige et al., p. 19.
106 Brundige et al., p. 19.
107 Budiardjo & Liong, p. 78.
indigenous eyewitnesses. In Osborne's 'Indonesia’s Secret War' there are numerous descriptions which detail many shocking instances of widespread village burnings, violence, torture, murder and rape. The physical and psychological effects of this appalling legacy are still felt by the indigenous population to this day.

**TNI operations and violence continue**
Over the last decade overt human rights abuses continue but are less internationally recognized, as limited international observers and sparse hard evidence still conceal much of what occurs inside West Papua. In 2010 a video was circulated of Indonesian soldiers brutally torturing a West Papuan man, causing the Indonesian government to bring these soldiers to trial. While condemned internationally by human rights groups, the horrific extent of this crime was downplayed by Indonesia’s military chief Admiral Agus Suhartono, who claimed that this was in fact just an excessive interrogation of a man linked to hiding weapons, rather than a blatant example of torture. Military power and influence within the region is still strong and predatory, and military operations also continue to occur in the highlands, with a village being burnt recently in the Pancak Jaya Regency named Bigiragi.

Militarised social control has historically merged with state policies promoting transmigration, beginning reportedly with many former military men migrating into the province with their families.

**Transmigration**
Transmigration has increased the marginalisation of indigenous groups in West Papua. This has been theorized as a deliberate Indonesian government strategy to alter the ethnic basis of the province and dilute concentrations of indigenous resistance through populating the territory with loyal Indonesian nationals. Large state funded transmigration schemes into West Papua occurred between 1969 and 2000. These were sponsored by the Indonesian government in conjunction with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and were officially aimed at alleviating the population density of other Indonesian provinces, and making better economic use of these apparently 'empty' lands. These migratory movements peaked from 1979 to 1984 when nearly 2.5 million Indonesians arrived. While continuing to this day, transmigration is no longer state funded and is of a smaller scale, fed mainly from 'spontaneous' migrants. From a mostly indigenous population of approximately 700,000 in 1963, West Papua now has a population over 3,593,803. This demographic growth threatens to make ethnic West Papuans a minority in their own land, as Indonesian migrants now consist of 51% of the total population.
population. Economic opportunities from the natural resource industry and development projects have also attracted many transmigrants, while many of the societal benefits and economic opportunities from these developments are less available or accessible for indigenous populations.

Development
Societal development has occurred within West Papua, but these improvements have been dispersed very unevenly throughout the territory's land mass and within the stratified populations that inhabit the territory. Many rural villages and communities that surround natural resource extraction sites still lack the basic infrastructural components of clean running water, sanitation and electricity. Freeport began funding large scale community development projects during the 1990s, prompted by bad publicity over the effects of its operations on the surrounding indigenous communities. This eventually led Freeport to commit 1 percent (US$15 million annually over 10 years) of its annual gross revenue from 1996 onwards towards socio-economic development within the area, aimed at improving local education, housing, employment and health. By 2001, Freeport had invested US$4.5 billion into the province, creating roads, helipads, an electricity/water supply, towns, hospitals, schools and other infrastructural necessities essential to running its daily operations and supporting its employee base. Although development has vastly improved collective life conditions in some districts, it has not reached many remote rural locations where roughly 75% of all indigenous people live.

Development, Indonisation and social exclusion
West Papua's development projects have brought with them unequal economic opportunities, increased social stratification and the imposition of Indonesian culture, values and ideals. This has put newly arrived Indonesians at an advantage and placed indigenous populations and their culture at risk. The growth of Indonesian businesses, institutions, education systems and media interfaces have progressively homogenized the traditional Papuan culture into Indonesian based designs. This process is described by Geitzelt as the 'Indonisation' of West Papua, which he contends extends the legitimacy and authority of the Indonesian state by making assimilation to the Indonesian language, culture and economic structures the cost of societal participation.

Employment
Prior to 1992 the benefits of foreign investment and employment opportunities from the natural resource industry were minimal for indigenous West Papuans. Even as late as 2003 only a quarter of Freeport's employees were ethnically Papuan. In 2006 this figure had risen slightly to 27%. The modern gas and oil industries have also historically employed less Papuan workers than

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121 Leith, 2003, p. 100.
123 Rifai-Hasan, p. 132.
126 Geitzelt, p. 201.
129 Stott, p. 16.
Indonesians, and while some improvements have also been made recently, many industries like manufacturing are dominated by Indonesians who predominantly favour hiring Indonesian workers. Fluency in the Indonesian language is often an essential prerequisite to finding any type of job within towns, even those in the low paying, difficult and low status sectors.

Poverty
Increased development and economic activity has lifted West Papua’s average income levels but has had a limited effect on elevating the indigenous population out of poverty. According to a UN study released in 2007, the number of people living under the poverty line in West Papua was 40.78%, the highest in the nation and over double the Indonesian national average of 18%. In 2008 West Papua’s poverty level had shrunk to 37.08% but in some districts such as Yuhukimo and Supiori over 50% of the population was classified as still living in poverty. While huge profits are extracted from West Papua, there is little evidence that very much of these revenues are being reinvested back into improving the life conditions and wellbeing of indigenous groups. Most indigenous rural villages have far greater percentages of poor people than cities, as the weakening of traditional sustenance methods, declining environmental resources and isolation from development-based economic activity, means there is little to alleviate poverty. Poverty, when assessed by the UNDP, incorporates health indicators such as under-weight children, health care provision, life expectancy and access to clean drinking water. The UNDP poverty index shows that ‘95% of all poor households resided in rural areas, markedly worse than the national average of 69%, and a clear indication that poverty was concentrated in the indigenous population’.

Literacy
Access to education and literacy rates can have a profound effect on the life chances and consequently the health of communities. Raising women’s literacy in particular correlates with drops in child mortality rates and greater improvements in prenatal care and nutritional practices. Literacy rates within the West Papuan population are the lowest within Indonesia and decreased from 74.5% in 2003 to 71.6% in 2005. As of 2009, literacy has risen again to 75.4%, but again great variations do exist between certain districts. A study conducted in 2005 found that while urban Sorong’s population was 97% literate, rural Manokwari’s literacy rate was decreasing at 33.9%. Similarly in the remote district of Yuhukimo only 17.6% percent of children finished their elementary

130 Whittaker, p. 74.
131 Geitzelt, p. 208.
137 Stott, p. 13.
schooling in 2008. Without access to education upward social mobility for new indigenous generations is severely limited, increasing the likelihood of future poverty and vulnerability to deprivation related illnesses.

**Physical health consequences and realities**

**Health care spending**
An Indonesian government Community Health Development Index which measures health care over 440 districts revealed that 14 of the 20 lowest districts within Indonesia are located within West Papua. This is despite its massive natural resource revenues, which do not translate into spending on social services: in 2004 West Papua generated the nation’s highest per-capita revenue but conversely spend the least per-capita on public health. Regardless of the massive demand and need, health services only attract 8% of district budgets, and the ratio of doctors to population numbers varies as widely, from 1:2000 to 1:23000. According to a 2002 report from *New Internationalist* magazine, 400,000 indigenous people living in the highlands were serviced by one hospital with 70 beds. The Indonesian government seems to lack motivation to improve health care in West Papua.

**A case study; HIV as reflective of societal positioning**
The rate of HIV infection in West Papua is representative of greater socio-economic inequalities and public expenditure deficits. This epidemic greatly affects the indigenous community and is reflective of this group’s impoverished societal positioning, low awareness levels and the province’s inadequate public health and education services. According to the NGO Caritas, the combination of poverty, inequality, ignorance, illiteracy and injustice has heightened the vulnerability of the indigenous population to infection, while the increasing scale of indigenous infection rates now compounds their societal stigmatisation and marginalisation.

Preventative information and even knowledge about the dangers of contracting HIV is less likely in underdeveloped remote communities without access to education. A 2007 survey found that less than 48 percent of rural Papuans had heard of AIDS, and that 2/3rds didn’t know how to use a condom, a finding which seems to match literacy rates from some rural locations.

**Development, inequality and HIV**
While Indonesian health officials often blame cultural sex practices such as ‘wife
swapping' for this epidemic, transmigration and the development-fed sex industry has been a major driver of the spread of the disease.\footnote{L Butt, 2002, 'The smoke screen of culture: AIDS and the Indigenous in Papua, Indonesia', \textit{Pacific Health Dialogue}, vol. 9, no. 2, 2002, pp. 283-289.} Mobility of natural resource workers, non-permanent labour migration and rotating military personal has increased the transmission and prevalence of this virus in West Papua.\footnote{Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS, \url{http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=2}, viewed 2 June 2011.} Escalating development and market demand has coupled with the exclusion and chronic poverty of indigenous populations, increasing the levels of Papuan women willing to engage in this sex industry for survival.\footnote{Butt, 2002, pp. 283-289.} The poverty of these sex workers and their mainly Papuan clients determine that transactions often take place in unregulated open air or street dwelling sites which decrease the likelihood of safety precautions being used.\footnote{Butt, 2002, pp. 283-289.} Indonesian sex workers and clients although still at risk, are more likely to use more expensive regulated brothels, hostess bars or hotels than Papuans, and thus have less risk of HIV exposure because of semi-regular screening practices and increased contraceptive use rates.\footnote{Butt, 2002, pp. 283-289.} As in most facets of West Papuan society 'ethnic divisions, sustained by political and economic inequalities show up in the sex industry as readily as they do in other institutions in the province'.\footnote{Butt, 2002, pp. 283-289.}

\textbf{Conspiracy theories}

The surge of HIV cases has become linked to rumours in the indigenous population that the Indonesian government and military purposefully introduced prostitutes infected with this virus into the area.\footnote{S Kirsch, 'Rumour and other narratives of political violence in West Papua', \textit{Critique of Anthropology}, vol. 22, no. 53, 2002, pp. 52-79.} In Butt's analysis, indigenous groups have rationalized the prevalence of indigenous HIV cases as attributable to 'fallen women' and 'lipstick girls' being brought into the province as part of a deliberate program to weaken and decimate ethnic West Papuan populations.\footnote{L Butt, 'Lipstick Girls and Fallen Women: AIDS and conspiratorial thinking in Papua, Indonesia', \textit{Cultural Anthropology}, vol. 20, issue. 3, 2005, pp. 412-442.} Such claims are obviously difficult to substantiate, but the popularisation of conspiracy theories themselves can be conceptualized as an improvised response to the existing disempowerment and positioning of this group in relation to overarching power structures.\footnote{Butt, 2005, p. 414.} According to Kirsch, the uncertainty but suspicion of these actions 'exemplifies the vulnerability of the West Papuans and the difficulty they have in accessing the threat posed to them by the Indonesian state', which is understandable after a history of systemic abuse, violence, discrimination and neglect.\footnote{Kirsch, p. 63.}

\textbf{Human development indicators}

The current 'health' of the indigenous population in West Papua is constructed from many socio-economic and societal factors, which include but are not limited to the direct physical actions of others. The subjugation and oppression of the indigenous people of West Papua have evolved in the modern age into the normalisation of their societal inequality and marginalisation within the Indonesian nation. Many indicators suggest that West Papua's collective living, health and well-
being conditions are consequentially the lowest within Indonesia, even when statistics include both the relatively prosperous migrant groups and disenfranchised ethnic West Papuans. When ranked in a ‘Human Development Index’ which creates a composite index from total life expectancy, literacy, education and improving living standards, 2009 statistics show that the divided Papuan provinces of Papua and West Papua are lowest and third lowest respectively out of all 33 Indonesian provinces.\(^ {159}\) The combination of many societal factors and the historic erosion of indigenous human security have translated into a physical and biological indigenous health crisis.

Health indicators
Modern and exact statistics that exemplify the degree of this indigenous health catastrophe are difficult to come by in the West Papua's current political conditions. These figures below are by no means comprehensive but give some illustration of the descending extent of this indigenous health crisis.

Malnutrition
• In some Papuan districts as much as 50% of the population is suffering from malnutrition with shortages of protein the biggest dietary problem.160

• 95% of the indigenous population are vegetarian and 86% typically only eat rice five days a week, the lack of variation causing vitamin deficiencies.161

Life expectancy
• From 1971 to 2002, Indonesian overall life expectancy rose by 20.5 years, while West Papua’s increased the least of any province, by only 8.5 years.162

• Recently life expectancy has risen within West Papua from 64.5 years in 1999 to 68 years in 2008, but remains as low as 56.36 years in some districts like Merauke.163

Women's maternal mortality
• As of 2005, the rate of maternal mortality was 1,116 per 100,000 births which is the highest rate in Indonesia.164

• In the district of Jancuk Jaya, the maternal mortality rates were three times higher than the national rate, with post partum haemorrhage the main cause of death.165

Mortality for infants and children under 5 years of age
• In 2005 the Papuan provinces had the highest infant mortality rates of any Indonesian provinces, totalling 396 per 100,000, compared with Indonesia's median of 262 per 100,000.166

• In certain districts this level is much higher, such as in Jancuk Jaya where infant mortality was about 85-150 per 1000 who survived childbirth.167

162 Rees et al., pp. 641-643.
165 Rees et al., pp. 641-643.
167 Rees et al., pp. 641-643. (statistics are given as ranges in this article)
The majority of young children's deaths across West Papua are caused by medically preventable malaria, upper respiratory tract infections and dysentery.\(^{168}\)

**Contagious diseases**

- Influenza is prevalent in cold highland areas.\(^{169}\)
- Malaria rates in West Papua exceed national averages.\(^{170}\)
- On average, 77% of all Papuan indigenous families have had at least one family member sick with malaria in the last year.\(^{171}\)
- Tuberculosis is the sixth leading cause of death within this region, triggering 6.7% of all mortalities.\(^{172}\)

- Yaws an infection of the skin and bones, was diagnosed 2,618 times in 2004, and leprosy is also a problem for indigenous groups.\(^{173}\)
- Disease conditions in Papua are dominated by contagious diseases.\(^{174}\)

**HIV/AIDS infection rates**

- HIV infection within Papua in 2007 amounted to 2.4% of the total population compared to Indonesia's average of 0.2%.\(^{175}\)
- The reported HIV/AIDS case rate in West Papua is 18 time higher than the national Indonesian average, and accounts for 40% of all documented HIV/AIDS cases within Indonesia.\(^{176}\)
- A 2006 study by Australian NGO Caritas found that 74% of all HIV

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\(^{168}\) Rees et al., pp. 641-643.
cases in West Papua were contracted by indigenous people (who comprise of 51% of the population).\textsuperscript{177}

- Recent estimates from June 2010 suggest that in highland areas of the Papua province as much as 7% of the population is HIV positive.\textsuperscript{178}

- The \textit{Jakarta Globe} reported in May 2011 that HIV/AIDS infections had increased by over 30 percent within 4 months, bringing the total number of diagnosed cases in the Papuan provinces to 17,098.\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{Deaths attributed to military actions and operations}

- The non-government organisation TAPOL places the total number of Indonesian military and security force related deaths in West Papua at 100,000 since 1963.\textsuperscript{180}


\textsuperscript{180} C Budiardjo, 'West Papua: Land of peace or killing field', paper presented at fifth international solidarity meeting for West Papua, Manila, 29 April - 1 May, TAPOL, 2005, \url{http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r050430.html}, viewed May 28 2011.
Conclusion

As a developing country, the Indonesian nation’s overall levels of health and development are less than ideal. Indonesia’s federal structure does not assume that revenue generated by a province will all be reinvested there. However this model does presume that each province and its national citizens will be uniformly catered for by the state and not permanently disadvantaged.

This does not seem to be the case in West Papua. Arguably this bias and its impact on indigenous health and well-being are more than the outcome of earlier national policies, but are in fact their extension into the modern age. Social control and pacification can be accomplished by many means, and in West Papua the political and economic prerogatives of the past still exist in the present, although cloaked under new more equitable guises.

The health and human security of indigenous West Papuans has been historically shaped and continues to be defined by the objectives and interests of powerful actors operating within its private and public spheres. These pressures have unfolded and evolved over many years and into many facets of indigenous life, transforming from overt oppression into more subtle and normalized marginalisation, inequality and subjugation. The physical health crisis they now face is the consequence and personification of this process. Whether deliberately engineered, or an incidental outcome of West Papua’s turbulent history, this result continues to benefit the private and public actors that first initiated this crisis of indigenous health and human security.


Health and human security in West Papua


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