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Session IV
Report Part X: Mobilising and sustaining political will

Presentation by NGO advisors to the Co-Chairs

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1. Introduction (AK)

Co-Chairs, Commissioners, Advisors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. Both I and Tilman Ruff have been cooperating with the Co-Chairs in the role of NGO Advisors. We are committed to making utmost efforts to support the Commission from the position of NGOs and civil society, to do what we can towards the Commission making a real difference on the urgently pressing need to abolish nuclear weapons.

Dr Tilman Ruff is the Chair of ICAN - the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and is working in collaboration with Australian and international NGOs, particularly through International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. We are pleased that Mayors for Peace, led by Mayor Akiba, was the first organisation to become a partner with ICAN. I myself, Akira Kawasaki, in my capacity as Executive Committee Member of Peace Boat have been working together with a broad range of Japanese organisations to form the ICNND Japan NGO Network, and cooperating as a member organisation of the global network Abolition 2000.

As you can see from the documents distributed, our diverse activities have included staging roundtables in Australia and Japan with the Co-Chairs and Commission staff, participating in Parliamentary Hearings, and providing information and encouraging engagement with members of our respective Parliaments. We have also actively engaged the media, cooperated to organise the Hibakusha Session at the Washington Commission meeting, conducted activities to raise the awareness of the general public, and contributed to the establishment of a senior group led by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser to promote a world free of nuclear weapons and support the work of the Commission.

We will continue to cooperate fully with you on the Commission's goals. Today we will briefly share our views on a number of issues that we feel should be addressed by the Commission. Please also refer to the Open Letter from the ICNND Japan NGO Network, the ICAN documents, and other papers by specialists we have distributed.

2. New science on regional nuclear war (TR)[1]

[1] With acknowledgement to Prof Alan Robock, Rutgers University and Dr Ira Helfand, IPPNW. See: http://envsci.rutgers.edu/~robock and www.ippnw.org

I too thank you for the opportunity to address you.

Good governance and public policy, like good medical practice, are based on facts and data, are driven by evidence, and reviewed in the light of new evidence.

Much discussion and policy about nuclear matters is not well grounded in physical and biological reality. I want to highlight some new data that I believe are key in informing the Commission's work.

My first topic is the effects of a limited regional nuclear war.

The understanding that firestorms created by nuclear weapons targeted on cities and industrial infrastructure would cause global cooling, darkening and rainfall decline – nuclear winter - and cause mass global starvation, was confirmed over 20 years ago by many scientific collaborations. Even a tiny fraction of the world's arsenal, targeted on cities, would have devastating effects on climate.

This evidence had a major impact on understanding of the universal and catastrophic nature of the nuclear threat, and made a major contribution to the START 1 and INF weapons reductions.

Recent studies by a number of the world's best regarded climate scientists, using the same sophisticated interactive state-of-the-art climate models which underpin our understanding of global warming, examined the climatic effects of a limited regional nuclear war. They confirmed that the earlier studies were sound, but that the effects would be more prolonged than previously thought.

They also studied 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs – just 0.03% (3/10,000^{ths}) of the explosive power of the world's current nuclear arsenal – targeted on cities in India and Pakistan. In addition to an estimated 44 million immediate casualties including 21 million deaths, and extensive radioactive contamination, an estimated 6.6 millions of tons of black, sooty smoke would be lofted high into the stratosphere, beyond rain and weather. Within a few weeks, the smoke would cover the globe, and persist for a decade or more.

Rapid cooling of 1.25°C global average surface temperature, unprecedented since the last Ice Age, with almost half the smoke and 0.5°C average cooling persisting after 10 years, with shortened growing seasons and killing frosts, rainfall decline, monsoon failure especially in Asia, and substantial increases in ultraviolet radiation – up to 70% in temperate latitudes, would combine to slash global food production over successive years. Global trade, transport and inputs to agriculture such as seeds, fertiliser and pesticides would be disrupted, those with food would hoard it, and further violent civil and potentially interstate conflict would be likely.

Currently, malnutrition contributes to the death of 5 million children under the age of 5 every year, and the 800 million already chronically malnourished people would likely succumb. There are at least 300 million additional people highly dependent on food imports which would no doubt cease. In recent years, global grain stocks have been at their lowest levels for more than 50 years – in 2007 down to just 56 days supply. Previous famines have taught us that even small declines in food supply can trigger famine through hoarding, price rises and panic. Across South Asia and well beyond, radioactive contamination of food and water would restrict their availability further, or entail additional harmful radioactive exposures for desperate people with no alternatives. Globally, of the order of one billion people could be expected to starve. More would succumb from

the disease epidemics and social and economic mayhem which would inevitably follow.

These climate data have been widely peer-reviewed, published and presented and their veracity has not been challenged. They underscore the unprecedented threat that nuclear weapons uniquely pose to all people, all life and the capacity of our planet to support complex life.

These studies further show that the consequences of any use of nuclear weapons are not linearly related to yield: per kiloton the fatalities and smoke emissions of low yield weapons are about 100 times those expected from high yield weapons.

Such a war is within the capacity of all nuclear armed states except for DPRK.

These findings warrant detailed study by national and international organisations including WHO, FAO, and IPCC. This has not yet occurred. Examinations by the world's peak technical agencies in health, food and agriculture, environment including climate, and other relevant areas, on the implications of nuclear weapons in their fields would be valuable, and something the Commission should encourage. An example is the landmark and influential reports by the World Health Organisation on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services in the 1980s, and which should be updated.

The data I have shown you unequivocally underscore the overwhelming need and urgency to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, and wind back all nuclear weapon stockpiles to zero. They underscore that preventing any use of nuclear weapons is paramount to the security of all people, and that no purpose could ever justify the use of nuclear weapons and the attendant risk of escalation. In relation to the Commission's envisaged stages of minimisation and elimination, the risk of unprecedented global catastrophe will not be substantially ameliorated until stockpiles are reduced not to hundreds and certainly not thousands, but to single or low double digits.

3. The case for a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention (AK)

Set clear goal of abolition

The catastrophic effects of any use of nuclear weapons would be totally unacceptable to humanity and cannot be justified under any circumstances. The Hibakusha — atomic bombing survivors — have consistently called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, from the strong conviction that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never again be repeated anywhere on earth. You have heard this expressed by the survivors who attended the Washington meeting in February.

In 1996, the Canberra Commission pointed out, "The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used — accidentally or by decision—defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again." Similarly, the NPT State parties reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference that "the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." In 2006, the WMD Commission reiterated "So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is a risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use

would be catastrophic." It called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to "start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons."

With such a background, the historic mission imposed on this International Commission is to articulate a clear roadmap towards the categorical outlawing and abolition of nuclear weapons. The norm that nuclear weapons are unacceptable in anyone's hands must become firmly established globally and be made legally binding.

The international community is often seen to be divided into the non-proliferation group of "haves" and the disarmament group of "have-nots." In the past decade, we have witnessed a toxic stalemate blocking both disarmament and non-proliferation processes. This was epitomised by the complete failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. However, as a historic new opportunity and momentum are emerging, the stalemate between non-proliferation and disarmament can be overcome. Now the global community should unite as an "abolition" group.

The current historic opportunity is borne out of crisis – business as usual is a recipe for a continued slide towards nuclear proliferation, anarchy and eventual inevitable disaster. A real paradigm shift is needed – that all the world's people have a shared stake in the urgent necessity to abolish nuclear weapons.

Comprehensive and step-by-step approaches are complementary and mutually reinforcing

Another division we believe is false and unhelpful is between incremental step-by-step approaches and a comprehensive approach focused on the ultimate goal. We believe both are essential and interrelated. Incremental steps can achieve important results, move us closer towards abolition, enable further steps, demonstrate goodwill and create political momentum. But unless they are steps along a path towards abolition they will be slow, piecemeal, beset with competing priorities and trade-offs, and insufficient; and not enjoy the necessary political credibility and support.

While we respect that careful consideration is being given by Commissioners to a three-stage approach, we feel it imperative that the Commission clearly and unequivocally establish as its goal the abolition of nuclear weapons, and the urgency of achieving it. If the Commission's approach becomes too biased towards discussion of a Vantage Point or other interim measures, there is a danger that its goal will become diverted, obscure and less credible. The Commission must avoid being seen as preparing yet another arms control and non-proliferation agenda of just "reducing but retaining."

Global civil society has long called for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), a comprehensive, verifiable, binding and irreversible treaty to categorically outlaw nuclear weapons and link all the inter-related aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation. This is both necessary and achievable. Pursuit of a comprehensive NWC is not inconsistent with existing step-by-step approaches to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, such as de-alerting, CTBT and FMCT. Rather, it supplements and reinforces them. Pursuit of an NWC would integrate all the fragmented steps into an overarching framework. Nor would an NWC run counter to the NPT, rather it would fulfill the promise of the NPT, which is lacking in detail, timeframe, processes, secretariat and organization.

Commence consultations on an NWC now

In his "5 Point Proposals" of October 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon encouraged nuclear-weapon states to consider "negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification" and indicated that the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia "offers a good point of departure."

A comprehensive treaty approach is tried and proven, and has been the approach which has worked for all the types of indiscriminate and inhumane weapons which have been outlawed, from dum dum bullets, chemical and biological weapons, to landmines and cluster munitions.

We find it distressing and perplexing that the detailed and well-developed model Nuclear Weapons Convention drafted by international lawyers, scientists and physicians has not been the subject of a detailed public analysis and response by any government or intergovernmental organization.

This is despite the support of the UN Secretary-General; the support by a recent vote of 177 to 130 for such an approach in the European Parliament and by the Interparliamentary Union; by the governments of Costa Rica, Malaysia and Indonesia; and overwhelming support among civil society organizations globally.

We recognize that efforts to achieve an NWC face many political, legal and technical challenges. That is why negotiations should commence as soon as possible. Even if immediate commencement of negotiations on an NWC is difficult, there is nothing preventing the commencement of consultations concerning the content and method of achieving an NWC, to help pave and prepare the way. Making some kind of start would be an important political step. We urge that you recommend commencing consultations on an NWC as a short-term goal for the international community, in which the Commission itself could play a role.

Commencing consultations on an NWC would help to de-legitimise nuclear weapons. Moreover, the non-discriminatory nature of an NWC would also help engage non-NPT nuclear armed states in international non-proliferation and disarmament talks.

We strongly recommend that Commissioners conduct substantive consultations concerning an NWC in the lead-up to and at the Hiroshima meeting in October and give consideration to the possibilities and issues involved. If the Commission undertakes such a task, civil society groups from around the world will do their utmost to cooperate and contribute.

Setting a clear goal of abolition with a roadmap for how to get there would gel with the Commission's aim of producing a report that has strong political impact. A hopeful goal brings out the wisdom and strength in people. We hope the Commission gears up the discussion for an NWC, which would have great influence on the international political environment.

4. Towards non-nuclear security (AK)

Reduce the role of nuclear weapons

The WMD Commission recommended all states possessing nuclear weapons "review their military plans" and "commence planning for security without nuclear weapons." We support this recommendation. Steps to progressively reducing and

eventually eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in the security policies of all states are vital to the de-legitimization and abolition of nuclear weapons.

Immediate reduction of alert status for weapons on high alert would sharply reduce the ever-present danger of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, including due to terrorist infiltration or cyber attack. This verifiable measure could reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used more rapidly than any other. High alert is not required for deterrence.

We understand that the Commission is promoting limiting the role of nuclear weapons to deterring other nuclear weapons – i.e. a no first use policy. We support this goal as an interim step. While insufficient alone, and difficult to verify and make binding, a declaration of no first use by the United States and other states possessing nuclear weapons could be made promptly and would be of considerable political significance and benefit to the international nuclear disarmament process. It would signal a decisive downgrading of the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and strengthen the norm against their use.

It would be timely for the Commission to express a clear view on the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to the United States and other countries, especially in the context of the United States' Nuclear Posture Review.

Challenge extended deterrence

In reducing the role of nuclear weapons, we stress that this responsibility lies not only with states possessing nuclear weapons but also with all those states reliant on nuclear weapons in their security policies. If this Commission, hosted by Australia and Japan, both with 'extended nuclear deterrence' as central to their policies, calls for extended nuclear deterrence to be abandoned and encourages governments and policy makers to commence planning for security without relying on nuclear weapons, it could have great impact internationally, including on the anticipated reviews by NATO and other countries of their nuclear policies.

Extended nuclear deterrence means being willing to support and be party to use of nuclear weapons, a fundamentally immoral position. It also entails exposing populations to an increased direct risk of being nuclear targets. And sooner or later, arguably sooner, this reliance will become an obstacle to nuclear disarmament. It would be tragic and ironic if continued insistence on extended nuclear deterrence in countries such as Australia and Japan, whose people have suffered the use of nuclear weapons in war and in nuclear testing, were to have the effect of making the abolition of nuclear weapons more difficult.

Some might argue that weakening extended nuclear deterrence may destabilize regional security, including leading to possible nuclear proliferation. However, civil society in many regions of the world, working to build confidence and a peaceful order, can provide examples in the search for non-nuclear security mechanisms.

Taking the example of Northeast Asia, collaborative work among civil society groups from Japan, Korea, China, Mongolia and other countries to study and promote a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia are gaining momentum. Civil society support for a NWFZ in the region is spreading through the networks of nuclear-free municipalities. Interest among political decision makers both in Japan and Korea is also growing. A call from the Commission for all countries to reduce and eliminate reliance on nuclear weapons would synergize with civil society and political decision makers in these countries, and exert great political impact.

At the same time, review of extended deterrence should be done in a manner that builds common and human security and would not promote a conventional arms race. Strengthening missile defense systems would have counter-productive effects. Political efforts to make all states feel secure without acquiring nuclear weapons or building up missile forces should be pursued.

Nuclear weapon dependence remains stuck in Cold-War thinking that exacerbates the unprecedented dangers to the security of all posed by nuclear weapons. The world must abandon this type of thinking. Threat reduction and trust building through dialogue and verification will be key. We hope that the Commission acknowledges the constructive roles played by civil society in this field.

5. Critical issues for nuclear power (TR)

I want now to highlight for you some new data in relation to radiation and health, a key aspect of this most uniquely hazardous technology ever invented – nuclear technology.

Ionising radiation packages energy in a form to which our DNA is highly vulnerable, damaging our core genetic blueprint, the most important thing we inherit from our parents and our most vital legacy for our children. Such damage to DNA is often but not always able to be repaired, leading to cancer, other chronic health effects, and potentially heritable genetic damage. A lethal dose of ionising radiation can involve no more energy than the heat in a cup of coffee.

When nuclear fuel undergoes fission in a reactor, the radioactivity of the products is increased roughly a million fold.

A key aspect of some radioactive materials is their extraordinary persistence. The half-lives of relevant uranium and plutonium isotopes are very long:

- U-238 – 4.51 billion years
- U-235 – 713 million years
- Pu-239 – 24,400 years

This longevity means that the accident, contamination, terrorist and proliferation dangers associated with these materials are essentially indefinite, far beyond the time horizons of any human institutions, including nation-states and governments. We cannot have any certainty about future political and social changes, including those that may affect the safety or use of fissile materials and their precursors. The timeframes under consideration by the Commission – years and decades - are quite out of step with the inherent nature of the materials involved. The risk of uranium provided to a state with no current nuclear weapons aspirations being available to a government with different intentions is a real possibility in any country over even a small fraction of the geological timeframes for which uranium or plutonium will exist.

Acting on the basis of the nature and risks inherent in such materials, rather than the complexion of their current owners, seems the only reasonable, evidence-based decision making framework for materials with such unique hazards and extraordinary longevity. Keeping these materials safe and out of weapons is an unavoidable obligation being imposed on every future human generation.

Essentially everything new that has been learned about the health hazards of radiation has increased the health risks for a given dose. Let me mention a few examples:

- the largest study to date of nuclear industry workers, by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, involving over 400,000 workers in 15 countries, with average measured exposures within current recommended occupational dose limits, showed a dose-related increase in cancer risk 4-6 times that expected on the basis of standard risk estimates derived from studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors.

- a rigorous study of 24 years of data from the German Childhood Cancer Registry has confirmed definitively a more than doubling of the risk of leukaemia, and about 50% overall increase in cancer, for children living within 5 km of a nuclear power plant, with elevated rates extending out to more than 50 km distance.

- state of the art genetic testing for chromosomal translocations, or mismatch of chromosome segments, has demonstrated almost 3-fold higher rates of translocations among New Zealand veterans of British nuclear tests in the Pacific than in a carefully matched control group, 5 decades after the tests

The last word on radiation health risks is certainly not in.

Safely managing nuclear facilities and materials requires a level of long-term custodianship more secure and reliable, and a time horizon longer, than has been demonstrated or could reasonably be expected of any human institution.

A very broad and numerous range of civil society organisations consider than nuclear power is not a part of the benign, renewable, sustainable energy future we urgently need to address that other unprecedented threat: climate change. ICAN's considered position is that the challenging but achievable goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will be much more readily achieved and sustained in a world in which nuclear power generation is being phased out. This is because the material and capacity to produce nuclear power *intrinsically* involves the capacity to produce fissile material usable for nuclear weapons.

Achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons will require very tight control of fissile materials and the capacity to produce them, and demands that the nuclear fuel chain be managed very much more effectively than currently. We see no alternative to production of and access to fissile materials being phased out – the commonly claimed 'inalienable right' of states to pursue essentially all aspects of the nuclear fuel chain short of building weapons is not compatible with a nuclear weapons free world.

We believe all uranium enrichment capacity – existing or new - should be multilaterally controlled under UN auspices, most appropriately by the IAEA, with equitable, rules-based access to low-enriched uranium (LEU).

Highly enriched uranium HEU should be phased out of civilian uses (including research reactors, radiopharmaceutical production and ship propulsion) and naval propulsion.

Reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium dramatically escalates proliferation risks and should cease.

While there is a real risk of non-state groups gaining control of one or more nuclear weapons, if I were seeking to create harm and havoc I would choose another, easier route. The world has 439 operating nuclear power reactors. They

are associated with spent fuel storage facilities which contain large amounts of long-lived radioisotopes, without the physical containment barriers associated with reactors. Attacking such facilities with missiles, an aircraft or truck laden with explosives; or disrupting their water supply, power or cooling systems, perhaps with insider infiltration, could cause radiological consequences akin to a nuclear weapon.

Joseph Rotblat demonstrated that the area subject to a cumulative radiation dose of 1 Gy over the first year after a 1 Mt nuclear explosion would be increased 17-fold were such a weapon exploded on a 1 GW nuclear reactor, and 30-fold, with more long-lived radioactivity, if such a weapon were exploded on a typical spent reactor fuel storage tank.

Using US Federal Emergency Management Agency software, US colleagues studied the radiological consequences of various reactor accident scenarios. As an example: catastrophic coolant failure at the Guang Dong 1 plant in China causes a fire which breaches and exposes the reactor core; 4% of radioactivity in the core is dispersed under typical May weather conditions. Over 48 hours, 27 million people are exposed to radiation doses in excess of the recommended annual population limit of 1 mSv; 8.1 million receive thyroid doses higher than the US EPA's Protective Action Guideline.

In a variety of ways, the line between the peaceful and the malevolent atom may become blurred.

We urge the Commission to very seriously address the proliferation risks and challenges nuclear power generation poses to achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons. We do not believe that an industry code of conduct on non-proliferation, which the industry at least in Australia is on record as opposing, or an elusive promise of proliferation-resistant technologies, will be adequate to the task.

It is also key for the Commission's credibility and effectiveness that there be no basis in reality or perception that nuclear power is being promoted, sanitised or green washed by the Commission, or that commercial nuclear interests in Australia and Japan are at play.

6. Conclusion

If the Commission is able to tackle these issues squarely and seize this historic opportunity to change the paradigm to a shared human security imperative for abolition, and chart a roadmap towards a nuclear weapons free world – we believe most effectively through promoting the early commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention - then civil society organisations around the world will labour wholeheartedly alongside you to ensure that the worst weapons of terror are removed from our world, and addressing the many other pressing shared global challenges becomes very much easier.

We thank you.

Annex

NGO Advisor Activities

As of June 2009

- NGO Advisor Akira Kawasaki was centrally involved in the organization and launch (January 2009) of the ICNND Japan NGO Network. This network is a broad coalition of civil society organisations aiming to make recommendations to the ICNND to assist its steady path to global nuclear abolition, and expand the participation and cooperation of civil society.

- In concert with this umbrella body, Kawasaki has helped the organisation of regular roundtables with Co-Chair Yoriko Kawaguchi. Two roundtables were held so far (24 December 2008 and 25 May 2009).

- Led efforts in Japan to facilitate the participation of four Hibakusha at the Washington meeting in February 2009, including grassroots fundraising, media promotions, and accompanying the Hibakusha to the United States.

- Ruff visited Japan in Nov 2008, collaborated with Japanese NGOs to meet Co-chair Yoriko Kawaguchi and Diet members from various political parties, discuss nuclear weapons abolition and promote parliamentary, media and NGO engagement with the Commission. He visited again in March 2009 and met with parliamentarians, civil society groups and journalists, including Amb. Nobuyasu Abe (ICNND Advisor/ Former UN Under-Secretary-General); Taro Kono (LDP member, Secretary-General of PNND Japan); Mizuho Fukushima (Chair, Social Democratic Party) etc.

- Kawasaki organised a visit to Tokyo by Co-Chair Gareth Evans and Secretariat Head Ian Biggs (26-27 May 2009), including meetings with parliamentarians, key civil society members and media, including Yasuo Fukuda (Former Prime Minister); Yohei Kono (Speaker, House of Representatives); Katsuya Okada (Secretary-General, Democratic Party of Japan); also around 30 participants in roundtable with Diet members.

- These activities have contributed to raising awareness amongst Diet members and other policy makers, as well as the media - both visits received significant domestic and some international media coverage.

- The ICNND Japan NGO Network is holding a regular series of seminars for general citizens to raise awareness and deepen understanding of the ICNND. Topics of discussion include extended deterrence, Nuclear Weapons Convention, and strengthening non-proliferation efforts related to civilian use of nuclear energy.

- Further information on the Network's activities is available on blog: http://icnndngojapan.wordpress.com

- ICAN working with Australian NGO partners, especially the United Nations Association of Australia, advocated for the establishment of the Commission.

- An academic nuclear disarmament research roundtable was held in Melbourne in Oct 2008 and members met with Gareth Evans and were briefed following the Commission’s first meeting in Sydney.

- ICAN advocated for a broad parliamentary enquiry into nuclear

disarmament. An Inquiry into Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament is now being undertaken by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, a multiparty, standing committee. See: <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/nuclearnon_proliferation> The Inquiry report is now expected in August 2009. ICAN and many partner organisations made submissions and a number were invited to appear in public hearings. The Inquiry terms of reference specifically include the Commission:
The Committee is to inquire into and report on:

- The international treaties involving Australia which relate to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
- How these treaties advance Australia's objectives in this field
- How the treaties might be made more comprehensive or effective
- How inter-parliamentary action can assist in strengthening treaty-based aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime
- How the Committee and the Parliament can contribute to the work of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

- Civil society groups are promoting the re-establishment of a parliamentary nuclear disarmament group.

- Ruff joined the Australian delegation to the 2009 NPT PrepCom as an NGO representative.

- A roundtable between senior ICNND secretariat staff and civil society organizations was held in the lead up to this year's NPT PrepCom.

- Ruff assisted former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser to convene a group calling for nuclear weapons abolition, promote Australia's contribution, and support the work of the Commission. The group also includes Sir Gustav Nossal - medical scientist,
Dr Barry Jones - former Labor government minister and Australian Labor Party President, General Peter Gration - former Defence Force chief, and Lieutenant-General John Sanderson - former Army chief, former governor of South Australia. The group recently published an op-ed simultaneously in the major broadsheet newspapers in Sydney and Melbourne: www.theage.com.au/opinion/imagine-theres-no-bomb-20090407-9zj0.html